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Abstract
Automatically analyzing information flow within Android applications that rely on crypto-
graphic operations with their computational security guarantees imposes formidable challenges
that existing approaches for understanding an app’s behavior struggle to meet. These approaches
do not distinguish cryptographic and non-cryptographic operations, and hence do not account
for cryptographic protections: f(m) is considered sensitive for a sensitive message m irrespective
of potential secrecy properties offered by a cryptographic operation f . These approaches conse-
quently provide a safe approximation of the app’s behavior, but they mistakenly classify a large
fraction of apps as potentially insecure and consequently yield overly pessimistic results.
In this paper, we show how cryptographic operations can be faithfully included into existing
approaches for automated app analysis. To this end, we first show how cryptographic operations
can be expressed as symbolic abstractions within the comprehensive Dalvik bytecode language.
These abstractions are accessible to automated analysis and can be conveniently added to existing
app analysis tools using minor changes in their semantics. Second, we show that our abstractions
are faithful by providing the first computational soundness result for Dalvik bytecode, i.e., the
absence of attacks against our symbolically abstracted program entails the absence of any attacks
against a suitable cryptographic program realization. We cast our computational soundness result
in the CoSP framework, which makes the result modular and composable.
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1 Introduction
Android constitutes an open-source project not only in terms of source code but also in terms of the
whole ecosystem, allowing practically everyone to program new apps and make them publicly available
in Google Play. This open nature of Android has facilitated a rapid pace of innovation, but it has
also led to the creation and widespread deployment of malicious apps [1, 2]. Such apps often cause
privacy violations that leak sensitive information such as location or the user’s address book, either
as an intended functionality or as a result of uninformed programming. In some cases such apps can
even extract sensitive information from honest apps.
A comprehensive line of research has, hence, strived to rigorously analyze how apps are accessing
and processing sensitive information. These approaches typically employ the concept of information
flow control (IFC), i.e., certain information sources such as GPS position and address book are declared
to be sensitive, and certain information sinks are declared to be adversarially observable. An IFC-based
analysis then traces the propagation of sensitive information through the program, i.e., if sensitive
data m is input to a function f , then the result f(m) is considered sensitive as well. IFC-based
analyses thereby determine if information from sensitive sources can ever reach an observable sink,
and in that case report a privacy violation.
A considerable number of apps rely on cryptographic operations, e.g., for encrypting sensitive
information before it is sent over the Internet. However, analyzing information flow within An-
droid apps that rely on such cryptographic operations with their computational security guarantees
imposes formidable challenges that all existing approaches for automated app analysis struggle to
meet, e.g., [3–5]. Roughly, these approaches do not distinguish cryptographic operations from other,
non-cryptographic functions. Thus, the standard information-tracing mechanism for arbitrary func-
tions applies: f(m) is considered sensitive for a sensitive message m irrespective of potential secrecy
properties offered by a cryptographic function f , e.g., the encryption of a sensitive message m is still
considered sensitive such that sending this encryption over the Internet is considered a privacy breach.
These approaches consequently provide a safe approximation of the app’s behavior, but they mistak-
enly classify a large fraction of apps as potentially insecure and consequently yield overly pessimistic
results. While approaches based on manual declassification have successfully managed to treat cryp-
tographic operations and their protective properties more accurately, see the section on related work
for more details, no concept for an accurate cryptographic treatment is known for automated analysis
of Android apps.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we show how cryptographic operations can be faithfully included into existing approaches
for automated app analysis on Android, in the presence of malicious apps or network parties aiming to
extract sensitive information from honest parties. Our paper makes two main tangible contributions
to this field: (i) we show how cryptographic operations can be expressed as symbolic abstractions
within Dalvik bytecode, so that existing automated analysis tools can adopt them with only minor
changes in their semantics; and (ii) we show that our abstractions are faithful by providing the first
computational soundness result for the comprehensive Dalvik bytecode language, i.e., the absence
of attacks against our symbolically abstracted program entails the absence of any attacks against a
suitable cryptographic program realization.
Symbolic abstractions in Dalvik bytecode. We first show how cryptographic operations can
be expressed as symbolic abstractions within Dalvik bytecode. These symbolic abstractions – often
also referred to as perfect cryptography or Dolev-Yao models – constitute idealizations of crypto-
graphic operations as free algebras that lend themselves towards automated analysis. Deriving such
abstractions within the comprehensive Dalvik bytecode language constitutes a challenging task, since
existing formalizations of Dalvik do not offer a distinction between honest and adversarially controlled
components, which is crucial for defining the rules that the symbolic adversary has to adhere to. To
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this end, we develop a novel semantic characterization of Dalvik bytecode that we call split-state se-
mantics that provides a clear separation between honest program parts and cryptographic API calls
with their corresponding augmented adversarial symbolic capabilities. Moreover, this split-state form
is key to our proof of computational soundness, see below. Existing tools for automated app analysis
can conveniently include our abstractions using minor changes in their underlying semantics, and
thereby reason more accurately about cryptographic operations.
Computational soundness for Dalvik bytecode. We show that our symbolic abstractions can
be securely instantiated using suitable cryptographic primitives, and thereby provide the first compu-
tational soundness result for Dalvik bytecode. More specifically, our result is grounded in the Abstract
Dalvik Language (ADL) [4], which constitutes the currently most detailed and comprehensive oper-
ational semantics for Dalvik in the literature. To this end, we first extended ADL by probabilistic
choices, as it otherwise would be inappropriate to express cryptographic operations.
We cast our computational soundness result in CoSP, a framework for establishing computational
soundness results that decouples the process of embedding programming languages into CoSP from the
computational soundness proofs itself. In particular, by casting our soundness results in CoSP, a rich
body of computational soundness results for individual cryptographic primitves [6–11] is immediately
valid for Dalvik bytecode without any additional work.
Establishing computational soundness results for Dalvik bytecode imposed a series of technical
challenges that many prior computational soundness works did not have to cope with. We highlight
one such challenge. Computational soundness results struggle when confronted with situations in
which binary operations are applied to outputs of cryptographic operations, e.g., if the parity of a
ciphertext should be checked, since such an operation would be undefined in the symbolic setting. Prior
computational soundness results simply excluded programs with such illegitimate operations; this
exclusion introduced an additional proof obligation for the automated analysis tool. While excluding
such programs simplifies the soundness result, integrating these additional proof obligations in existing
automated app analysis tools constitutes a tedious task, since the tools would need to check upfront
whether any symbolically undefined operations will be performed on symbolic terms, in any execution
branch. As a consequence, we hence decided to establish a computational soundness result that over-
approximates such scenarios by sending information of such illegitimate operations to the adversary
and letting the adversary decide the result of such operations.
Finally, our proof reveals an additional result that we consider of independent interest: we show
that any small-step semantics S in split-state form entails a canonical small-step semantics S∗ for a
symbolic model that is computationally sound with respect to S. Hence, for establishing a computa-
tionally sound symbolic abstraction for any given programming language, it suffices to show that the
interaction with the attacker and the cryptographic API can be expressed by means of our concept of
split-state semantics.
1.2 Summary of Our Techniques
This section summarizes the techniques that we use to achieve these results. We believe that this makes
the paper better accessible. Finally, we discuss how our results can be used to extend information
flow tools.
The CoSP framework. A central idea of our work is to reduce computational soundness of Dalvik
bytecode to computational soundness in the CoSP framework [6,10]. All definitions in CoSP are cast
relative to a symbolic model that specifies a set of constructors and destructors that symbolically rep-
resent the cryptographic operations and are also used for characterizing the terms that the attacker
can derive (called symbolic attacker knowledge), and a computational implementation that specifies
cryptographic algorithms for these constructors and destructors. In CoSP, a protocol is represented
by an infinite tree that describes the protocol as a labeled transition system. Such a CoSP proto-
col contains actions for performing abstract computations (applying constructors and destructors to
messages) and for communicating with an adversary. A CoSP protocol is equipped with two different
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Figure 1: Overview of the main technical lemmas, where e is the embedding into CoSP
semantics: (i) a symbolic CoSP execution, in which messages are represented by terms; and (ii) a com-
putational CoSP execution, in which messages are bitstrings, and the computational implementation
is used instead of applying constructors and destructors. A computational implementation is said to
be computationally sound for a class of security properties if any CoSP protocol that satisfies these
properties in the symbolic execution also satisfies these properties in the computational execution.
The advantage of expressing computational soundness results in CoSP is that the protocol model
in CoSP is very general so that the semantics of other languages can be embedded therein, thereby
transferring the various established soundness results from CoSP into these languages [6–11].
Symbolic ADL and probabilistic choices. ADL as defined in [4] does not support probabilistic
choices, and hence no generation of cryptographic keys and no executions of cryptographic functions.
We thus extended ADL with a rule that uniformly samples random values (more concretely: a register
value from the set of numerical values).
We consider attackers that are external to the app, e.g., malicious parties or network parties with
the goal of extracting secrets from an honest app. We characterize the interaction points of the attacker
with our extended version of ADL by a set of so-called malicious functions that communicate with the
attacker. The attacker itself is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time machine. We introduce an
additional semantic rule that is applied whenever a malicious function is called. The rule invokes the
attacker with the arguments of the function call and stores the response of the attacker as a return
value. For defining the indistinguishability of two ADL programs, we additionally require that the
adversary can also send a single bit b as a final guess, similar to other indistinguishability definitions.
This entails the notions of symbolic equivalence (≈ADLs , in the symbolic setting) and of computational
indistinguishability (≈ADLc , in the computational setting) of two ADL programs.
Split-state semantics for symbolic ADL. Establishing a computational soundness proof for
ADL requires a clear separation between honest program parts and cryptographic API calls with
their corresponding augmented adversarial symbolic capabilities. To achieve this, we characterize this
partitioning by introducing the concept of a split-state form of an operational semantics. The split-
state form partitions the original semantics into three components, parallelly executed asynchronously:
(i) all steps that belong to computing cryptographic operations (called the crypto-API semantics),
(ii) all steps that belong to computing the malicious functions (called the attacker semantics), and
(iii) all steps that belong to the rest of the program (called the honest-program semantics). Moreover,
we define explicit transitions between each of these components, which gives rise to a precise message-
passing interface for cryptographic operations and for communicating with the attacker.
Our strategy for showing computational soundness is to use this split-state form for phrasing the
symbolic variant as a small-step semantics by replacing the crypto-API semantics with the symbolic
constructors and destructors from the symbolic model, and by replacing the attacker semantics by the
symbolic characterization of the attacker. With this symbolic semantics at hand, we define split-state
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symbolic equivalence (≈SSs ) as equivalence of (sets of) traces. However, as explained before, we first
have to resolve the problem that computational soundness results struggle to deal with situations
in which binary operations are applied to outputs of cryptographic operations. We decided not to
exclude programs that exhibit such behaviors, but to perform an over-approximation instead by letting
the adversary determine the outcome of such operations. This makes our abstractions conveniently
accessible for existing tools, but it also complicates the computational soundness proof since we have
to consider the operations of constructors and destructors on non-symbolic terms as well. To this end,
we encode them as bitstrings and interpret these bitstrings symbolically again. Fortunately, symbolic
bitstring interpretations can be seamlessly combined with all previous CoSP results.
We finally define computational indistinguishability of two honest program semantics in the split-
state computational execution of ADL (≈SSc ). As usual, the adversary we consider is a probabilistic
polynomial-time machine, and all semantics constitute families of semantics that are indexed by a
security parameter.
It might be of independent interest that our symbolic variant of the semantics and the compu-
tational indistinguishability can be defined on the split-state form independently of ADL. We show
that ADL can be brought into such a split-state form, then prove later that symbolic equivalence in
ADL implies symbolic equivalence in the split-state form, and conclude by proving that computational
indistinguishability in the split-state form implies computational indistinguishability in ADL. Hence,
for every two ADL programs Π1,Π2 and initial configurations s1, s2 (Πi〈si〉 denoting Πi with initial
configuration si) we have
Π1〈s1〉≈ADLs Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈SSs Π2〈s2〉, and
Π1〈s1〉≈SSc Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc Π2〈s2〉.
Computational soundness proof. We first construct an injective embedding e that maps every
ADL program to a CoSP protocol. We stress that within CoSP, the same CoSP protocol is used for the
computational and the symbolic execution and that CoSP requires a separation of the attacker and the
cryptographic operations from the rest of the program. Our split-state form precisely satisfies these
requirements. The embedding e uses the honest-program semantics to iteratively construct a CoSP
protocol: a transition to the crypto-API semantics corresponds to a computation node; a transition
to the attacker semantics corresponds to an output node followed by an input node; and whenever
several possibilities exist, a control node is selected to let the adversary decide which possibility (which
node) to take.
We prove this embedding sound in the symbolic model, and we prove it complete with respect
to the range of e in the computational model, i.e., for every two ADL programs Π1,Π2 and initial
configurations s1, s2 we have
Π1〈s1〉≈SSs Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ e(Π1〈s1〉)≈CoSPs e(Π2〈s2〉)
and
e(Π1〈s1〉)≈CoSPc e(Π2〈s2〉) =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈SSc Π2〈s2〉,
where ≈CoSPs and ≈CoSPc denote symbolic equivalence and computational indistinguishability in CoSP.
Figure 1 finally shows how all pieces are put together:
Theorem 1 (computational soundness of Dalvik – simplified). Let Π1,Π2 be two ADL
programs that use the same crypto-API and s1, s2 be two initial configurations. Then we have
Π1〈s1〉≈ADLs Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc Π2〈s2〉.
Extension of information flow tools. To put our work in perspective, we elaborate on a possible
application of our result. We envision the extension of information flow (IF) methods with symbolic
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abstractions. On a high-level, we envision the following approach for extending IF-tools: whenever
there is a potential information flow from High to Low and a cryptographic function is called, we
extract a model of the app and query a symbolic prover to find our whether the attacker learns
something about the High values. As in symbolic ADL only a few semantic rules are changed w.r.t.
ADL, modifications to existing analyses are likely to be confined, thus simple to integrate.
This approach imposes the challenge of extracting a model of the app. Our embedding of an
ADL program into CoSP already extracts a symbolic model for the program. However, shrinking this
extracted model to a manageable size and querying the symbolic prover in a way such that it scales
to complex apps is a task far from simple that merits a paper on its own.
1.3 Overview
Section 3 reviews the CoSP framework for equivalence properties that we ground our computational
soundness result on. Section 4 reviews the Abstract Dalvik Language (ADL). Sections 5 and 6 define
the probabilistic execution of ADL and introduce our symbolic variant of ADL, including the symbolic
abstractions of cryptographic operations and the capabilities of the symbolic adversary. Section 7
defines the connections between ADL, symbolic ADL, and CoSP, and based on these connections
proves the computational soundness result. Section 8 discusses related work. We conclude in Section
9 with a summary of our findings and outline directions for future research.
2 Notation
Let N be the set of natural numbers and assume that they begin at 0. We abbreviate the statement
that a set A is a finite subset of a set B as A ⊆fin B. For indicating that function f from a set
A to a set B is a partial function, we write f : A ⇀ B. We use squared brackets in two different
ways: (i) m[pp] denotes the instruction with the number pp for a set of instructions m, and (ii)
r[v 7→ val ] := (r \ (v, r(v))) ∪ (v, val) is short-hand for the function mapping v to val and otherwise
behaving like r. We lift this notation to functions, i.e., r[f ](v) is equal to f(v) if f is defined on v,
and equal to r(v) otherwise. Throughout the paper, we use η as the security parameter. We use ε to
denote the empty sequence, empty path, empty bitstring, or empty action depending on the context.
We write t for a sequence t1, . . . , tn if n is clear from the context. For any sequence l ∈ E∗, we use · to
denote concatenation l1 · l2, as well as the result of appending (l ·e) or prepending (e · l) an element, as
long as the difference is clear from context. We use (f(l))e∈l to the sequence resulting from applying
the (meta-language) operation f to each element in a sequence l, e.g., (e2)e∈{1,2,3} is the sequence of
the first three square numbers. We use l|k0 to denote the k-prefix of l. We filter a sequence l by a set
S, denoted l|S , by removing each element that is not in S. We use similar notation for the projection
of a sequence l = s1, . . . , sn ∈ S∗: given a partial function pi : S ⇀ T , l|pi = (s1, . . . , sn−1)|pi · pi(sn) or
(s1, . . . , sn−1)|pi, if pi(sn) undefined. (e)l denotes the sequence of length l where each element equals
e. As we represent the attacker as a transition system, we sometimes write TA and sometimes A for
the attacker.
3 CoSP Framework (Review)
The computational soundness proof developed in this paper follows CoSP [6,10], a general framework
for conducting computational soundness proofs of symbolic cryptography and for embedding these
proofs into programming languages with their given semantics. CoSP enables proving computational
soundness results in a conceptually modular and generic way: every computational soundness result
for a cryptographic abstraction phrased in CoSP automatically holds for all suitably embedded lan-
guages, and the process of embedding is conceptually decoupled from computational soundness proofs.
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Hence in this work, we will suitably embed Dalvik Bytecode into CoSP, and thereby leverage existing
computational soundness results of CoSP.
In Section 3.1, we review the symbolic model of CoSP, which encompasses symbolic abstractions
of cryptographic operations and the representation of programs (which are called protocols) in CoSP.
In Section 3.2, we present the notion of symbolic equivalence in CoSP, which defines that two CoSP
protocols are indistinguishable for an attacker that operates on symbolic abstractions. In Section 3.3,
we review the notion of computational indistinguishability in CoSP, which defines the execution of
protocols using actual cryptographic algorithms. In Section 3.4, we finally review CoSP’s notion of
computational soundness.
3.1 Symbolic Model & Execution
CoSP provides a general symbolic model for expressing cryptographic abstractions. We start with
some basic concepts such as constructors, destructors, nonces and message types.
Definition 1 (CoSP Terms). A constructor C is a symbol with a (possibly zero) arity. A nonce N is
a symbol with zero arity. We write C/n ∈ C to denote that C contains a constructor C with arity n.
A message type T over C and N is a set of terms over constructors C and nonces N. A destructor
D of arity n, written D/n, over a message type T is a partial map Tn → T. If D is undefined on t,
we write D(t) = ⊥.
In CoSP, symbolic abstractions of protocols and of the attacker are formulated in a symbolic model,
including countably infinite set of nonces partitioned into protocol and attacker nonces.
Definition 2 (Symbolic model). A symbolic modelM = (C,N,T,D) consists of a set of constructors
C, a set of nonces N, a message type T over C and N (with N ⊆ T), a set of destructors D over T.
We require that N = NE unionmultiNP for countably infinite sets NP of protocol nonces and attacker nonces
NE.
To unify notation for constructors, destructors, and nonces, we define the evaluation of terms as
the partial function evalF : Tn → T for every constructor or destructor F/n ∈ D∪C and every nonce
F ∈ N as follows: (where n = 0 for a nonce).
Definition 3 (Evaluation of terms). If F is a constructor, define evalF (t) ··= F (t) if F (t) ∈ T
and evalF (t) ··= ⊥ otherwise. If F is a nonce, define evalF () ··= F . If F is a destructor, define
evalF (t) ··= F (t) if F (t) 6= ⊥ and evalF (t) ··= ⊥ otherwise.
Protocols. In CoSP, protocols are represented as infinite trees with the following nodes: computation
nodes are used for drawing fresh nonces and for applying constructors and destructors; input and
output nodes are used for send and receive operations; control nodes are used for allowing the attacker
to schedule the protocol. A computation node is annotated with its arguments and has two outgoing
edges: a yes-edge, used for the application of constructors, for drawing a nonce, and for the successful
application of a destructor, and a no-edge, used if an application of a constructor or destructor F on
a term t fails, i.e., if evalF (t) = ⊥. Nodes have explicit references to other nodes whose terms they
use. For example, a computation node that computes C(t) references the node that produced t, e.g.,
an input node or another computation node.
Definition 4 (CoSP protocol). A CoSP protocol Π for a symbolic model M = (C,N,T,D) is a tree
of infinite depth with a distinguished root and labels on both edges and nodes. Each node has a unique
identifier ν and one of the following types:1
1In contrast to the definition in the original CoSP framework [6], we do not consider the type “non-deterministic
node”. This type has been obsolete for all embeddings of symbolic calculi that have been established in the original
framework so far as well.
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• Computation nodes are annotated with a constructor, nonce or destructor F/n ∈ C ∪NP ∪D
together with the identifiers of n (not necessarily distinct) nodes; we call these annotations
references, and we call the referenced nodes arguments. Each computation node ν has exactly two
successors; yes(ν) and no(ν), the corresponding edges are labeled with yes and no, respectively.
• Input nodes have no annotations. They have exactly one successor, succ(ν).
• Output nodes have a reference to exactly one node in their annotations. They have exactly one
successor, succ(ν).
• Control nodes are annotated with a bitstring l. They have at least one and up to countably
many successors; the corresponding edges are labeled with distinct bitstrings l′. We call l the
out-metadata and l′ the in-metadata of this node.
We assume that the annotations are part of the node identifier. A node ν can only reference other
nodes ν′ on the path from the root to ν; in this case ν′ must be a computation node or input node. If
ν′ is a computation node, the path from ν′ to ν has additionally to go through the outgoing edge of ν′
with label yes.
Symbolic operations. As a next step, we model the capabilities of the symbolic attacker. We have
to capture which protocol messages the attacker observes, in particular in which order an attacker
observe these messages. Moreover, we have to capture which tests an attacker can perform in order
to judge whether two protocols are distinguishable. These tests, called symbolic operations, capture
the sequence of operations a symbolic attacker applies, including the used protocol messages. This
notion is sometimes referred to as a recipe.
Definition 5 (Symbolic Operation). Let M = (C,N,T,D) be a symbolic model. A symbolic op-
eration O/n (of arity n) on M is a finite tree whose nodes are labeled with constructors from C,
destructors from D, nonces from N, and formal parameters xi with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For constructors
and destructors, the children of a node represent its arguments (if any). Formal parameters xi and
nonces do not have children. The set of symbolic operations of arity n for a model M is denoted as
SO(M)n. The set SO(M) :=
⋃
n∈N SO(M)n is the set of all symbolic operations for M. We extend
the evaluation function to symbolic operations. Given a list of terms t ∈ Tn, the evaluation function
evalO : T
n → T recursively evaluates the tree O starting at the root as follows: The formal parameter
xi evaluates to ti. A node with F ∈ C ∪NE ∪D evaluates according to evalF , where NE ⊆ N are
attacker nonces. If there is a node that evaluates to ⊥, the whole tree evaluates to ⊥.
Note that the identity function is included. It is the tree that contains only x1 as node.
Symbolic execution. A symbolic execution is a path through a protocol tree defined as defined
below. It induces a symbolic view, which contains the communication with the attacker. We, moreover,
define an attacker strategy as the sequence of symbolic operations that the attacker performs in the
symbolic execution. It induces a view, which contains the communication with the attacker. Together
with the symbolic execution, we define an attacker strategy as the sequence of symbolic operations
that the attacker performs.
Definition 6 (Symbolic executions). Let a symbolic model M = (C,N,T,D) and a CoSP protocol
Π for M be given. Let Views = (Event in ∪ Eventout ∪ Eventctl)∗, with Event in := {in} × T ×
SO(M),Eventout := {out} ×T∗,Eventctl := {control} × {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗. We define
 CoSPs⊆Views∗ ×Nodes × (Nodes → T)→
Views∗ ×Nodes × (Nodes → T)
as the smallest relation s.t. the rules from Figure 2 hold, where t˜ ··= f(ν˜1), . . . , f(ν˜|ν˜|), for the nodes
ν˜1, . . . , ν˜|ν˜| referenced by ν (for computation nodes). The set of symbolic executions of Π is defined
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(V, ν, f) CoSPs (V, yes(ν), f [ν 7→ m]) ν computation n. with F ∈ C ∪D ∪N, m ··= evalF (t˜) 6= ⊥
(V, ν, f) CoSPs (V,no(ν), f) ν computation node with F ∈ C ∪D ∪N, evalF (t˜) = ⊥
(V, ν, f) CoSPs (V · (in, (t, O)), succ(ν), f [ν 7→ t]) ν input node, t ∈ T, O ∈ SO(M), evalO(Out(V )) = t
(V, ν, f) CoSPs (V · (out, t˜1), succ(ν), f) ν output node
(V, ν, f) CoSPs (V · (control, (l, l′)), ν′, f) ν control n., out-metadata l, successor ν′ has in-metadata l′
Figure 2: Rules for defining the smallest relation for the symbolic execution
as
SExec(Π) :={((V0, ν0, f0), . . . , (Vn, νn, fn)) | n ∈ N
∧ ∀i.(Vi, νi, fi) CoSPs (Vi+1, νi+1, fi+1)},
where (V0, ν0, f0) = (, root(Π), ∅). Vi is called a symbolic view for step i. The set of symbolic views
of Π is defined as
SViews(Π) := {Vn|(V0, ν0, f0), · · · , (Vn, νn, fn) ∈ SExec(Π)}
Given a view V , Out(V ) denotes the list of terms t contained in (out, t) ∈ V . Out-Meta(V ) denotes
the list of terms l contained in elements of the form (control, (l, l′)) in the view V . In(V ), called the
attacker strategy, denotes the list of terms that contains only entries of V of the form (in, (t, O))
or (control, (l, l′)), where for (in, (t, O)) the entry (in, O) is stored and for (control, (l, l′)) the entry
(control, l′) is stored. [In(V )]SViews(Π) denotes the equivalence class of all views U ∈ SViews(Π) with
In(U) = In(V ).
Symbolic knowledge. The symbolic knowledge of the attacker comprises the results of all symbolic
tests the attacker can perform on the messages output by the protocol. The definition captures that
the attacker knows exactly which symbolic operation leads to which result.
Definition 7 (Symbolic knowledge). LetM be a symbolic model. Given a view V with |Out(V )| = n,
a symbolic knowledge function fV : SO(M)n → {>,⊥} is a partial function from symbolic operations
(see Definition 5) of arity n to {>,⊥}. The full symbolic knowledge function is a total symbolic
knowledge function KV (O) defined by
KV (O) ··=
{
⊥ if evalO(Out(V )) = ⊥
> otherwise.
3.2 Symbolic Equivalence
Two views are equivalent, denoted as V ∼ V ′, if they (i) have the same structure (i.e., the same order
of out, in, control entries), (ii) have the same out-metadata (i.e., VOut-Meta = V ′Out-Meta), and (iii)
lead to the same knowledge (i.e., KV = KV ′). Finally, two CoSP protocols are symbolically equivalent
(≈CoSPs ) if its two variants lead to equivalent views when run with the same attacker.
Definition 8 (Equivalent views). Let two views V, V ′ of the same length be given. We denote their ith
entry by Vi and V ′i , respectively. V and V ′ are equivalent (V ∼ V ′), if the following three conditions
hold:
1. (Same structure) Vi is of the form (s, ·) if and only if V ′i is of the form (s, ·) for some s ∈
{out, in, control}.
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(V, v, f)→ (V, yes(v), f [ν 7→ m]) ν computation node with F ∈ C ∪D ∪N,m ··= evalF (t˜) 6= ⊥
(V, v, f)→ (V,no(v), f) ν computation node with F ∈ C ∪D ∪N, evalF (t˜) = ⊥
(V, v, f)
in(O)−−−−→ (V (˙in, (t, O)), succ(v), f [ν 7→ t]) ν input node, t ∈ T, O ∈ SO(M), evalO(Out(V )) = t
(V, v, f)
out−−→ (V · (out, t˜1), succ(v), f) ν output node
(V, v, f)
control(l)−−−−−−−→ V · (control, (l, l′)), ν′, f) ν control n., out-metadata l, successor ν′ has in-metadata l′
Figure 3: Labelled transition
2. (Same out-metadata) Out-Meta(V ) = Out-Meta(V ′).
3. (Same symbolic knowledge) KV = KV ′ .
Finally, we define two protocols to be symbolically equivalent if the two protocols lead to equivalent
views when faced with the same attacker strategy. Thus, a definition of symbolic equivalence should
compare the symbolic knowledge of two protocol runs only if the attacker behaves identically in both
runs.
Given the static equivalence relation from Definition 8, the notion of symbolic equivalence in CoSP
is defined as trace equivalence.
Definition 9 (Symbolic equivalence). Let M be a symbolic model and P be a class of protocols for
M. Let tracesA(Π) =
{
[A]SViews(Π)
}
denote the list of traces for an attacker strategy A. We lift the
relation ∼ from Definition 8 to sets, i.e., A ∼ B iff. ∀a ∈ A∃b ∈ B.a ∼ b and vice versa.
Two protocols Π1,Π2 ∈ P are trace equivalent (Π1≈CoSPs Π2), if, for all attacker strategies A,
tracesA(Π1) ∼ tracesA(Π2).
Definition 10 ((Weak) bisimilarity). A (weak) bisimulation relation is a symmetric relation
R : Views∗ ×Nodes × (Nodes → T)×Views∗ ×Nodes × (Nodes → T)
such that, if ARB, then
• KVA = KVB (where VA,VB are the symbolic views in A and B).
• if A→ A′ then there is B′ s.t. B →∗ B′ and ARB
• if A α−→ A′ then there is B′ such that B →∗ α−→→∗ B′ and ARB.
If there exist a weak bisimulation relation between A and B, they are bisimilar.
Without non-deterministic nodes, more generally without internal non-determinism, the notion of
trace equivalence (i.e., symbolic equivalence from Definition 9) is equivalent to weak bisimilarity.
Lemma 1. For any modelM, any two processes Π1 and Π2 are trace equivalent if they are bisimilar.
Proof. We introduce the following function mapping a single stap of a trace, i.e., e ∈ Views to labels
according to Definition 3. Let
β(v) =

in(O) if v = (in, (t, O)) ∈ Event in
out if v = (out, t˜) ∈ Eventout
control(l) if v = (control(l, l′)) ∈ Eventctl .
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(ν, f, n) CoSPc (yes(ν), f [ν 7→ n(N)], n) ν computation node with N ∈ N and n(N) 6= ⊥
(ν, f, n) CoSPc (yes(ν), f [ν 7→ m], n[N 7→ m) ν computation node with N ∈ N and n(N) = ⊥
and m drawn according to ImplN (η).
(ν, f, n) CoSPc (yes(ν), f [ν 7→ m], n) ν computation node with F ∈ C ∪D ∪N, andAF (η, t˜) = m 6= ⊥
(ν, f, n) CoSPc (no(ν), f, n) ν computation node with F ∈ C ∪D ∪N, andAF (η, t˜) = ⊥
(ν, f, n) CoSPc (succ(ν), f [ν 7→ m], n) ν input node, a request bitstring and receive m
(ν, f, n) CoSPc (succ(ν), f, n) ν output note, send m˜1 to the communication partner
(ν, f, n) CoSPc (ν′, f, n)
ν control node with out-metadata l, send l to communication
partner and receive in-metadata l′. If there is an edge with label
l′, let ν′ be the successor of ν along the edge labeled l′; otherwise
let ν′ be the successor with the lexicographically smallest edge
label.
Figure 4: Rules defining the smallest relation for the computational execution, where yes(ν) and no(ν)
are the yes- and no-successor of ν (for computation nodes), succ is the successor node (for input or
output nodes), and t˜ ··= t˜j ··= f(ν˜j) with ν˜ are the nodes referenced by ν (for computation nodes).
Without loss of generality, we assume that each CoSP tree is transformed into a CoSP tree where each
node uniquely describes its subtree completely. Fix an arbitrary trace t1 = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ tracesA(Π1).
By Definition 6 and Figure 3, there is a sequence of transitions and triples (Vi, νi, fi) such that:
(V0, ν0, f0)→∗ β(v1)−−−→→∗ · · · →∗ β(vn)−−−→→∗ (Vn, νn, fn),
and v0 = Π1. As Π1 and Π2 are bisimilar, there exists a sequence of transitions and triples (V ′i , ν′i, f ′i)
such that v′0 = Π2, and
(V ′0 , ν
′
0, f
′
0)→∗
β(v1)−−−→→∗ · · · →∗ β(vn)−−−→→∗ (V ′n, ν′n, f ′n),
as well as KVn = KVn′ . The latter point implies that the third condition of Definition 8 holds for
(V0, . . . , Vn) and (V ′0 , . . . , V ′n). From the relation between the view and the labels in each transi-
tion described in Definiton 3, it follows that the first and second condition holds. Hence for each
(V0, . . . , Vn) ∈ SViews(Π1) there exists an equivalent view (V ′0 , . . . , V ′n) ∈ SViews(Π2). The same
argument can be made for Π2 in place of Π1 and vice versa, thus Π1 and Π2 are trace equivalent.
3.3 Computational execution
In the computational setting, symbolic constructors and destructors are realized with cryptographic
algorithms. A computational implementation is a family Impl = (Ax)x∈C∪D∪NP of deterministic
polynomial-time algorithms ImplF for each constructor or destructor F ∈ C ∪D as well as a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time (ppt) algorithm AN for drawing protocol nonces N ∈ N. The first argument
of ImplF and AN represents the security parameter.
Definition 11 (Computational implementation). Let M = (C,N,T,D) be a symbolic model. A
computational implementation of M is a family of functions Impl = (Ax)x∈C∪D∪N such that AF for
F/n ∈ C ∪D is a partial deterministic function N × ({0, 1}∗)n → {0, 1}∗, and AN for N ∈ N is a
total probabilistic function with domain N and range {0, 1}∗. All functions AF have to be computable
in deterministic polynomial time, and all AN have to be computable in probabilistic polynomial time
(ppt).
We extend the computational implementation to symbolic operations. The computational imple-
mentation of a symbolic operation O ∈ SO is defined AO : ({0, 1}∗)n → {0, 1}∗, recursively evaluating
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the tree O starting at the root as follows: The formal parameter xi computed to ith input value. A
node with F ∈ C ∪NE ∪D is computed according to AF . If the function is undefined for any node,
then the AO is undefined on these inputs.
Computational execution. The computational execution of a protocol is a randomized interactive
machine, called the computational challenger, that traverses the protocol tree and interacts with a ppt
attacker A: at a computation node the corresponding algorithm is run and depending on whether the
algorithm succeeds or outputs ⊥, either the yes-branch or the no-branch is taken; at an output node,
the message is sent to the attacker, and at an input node a message is received by the attacker; at a
control node the attacker sends a command that specifies which branch to take. The transcript of the
execution contains the computational counterparts of a symbolic view.2
Definition 12 (Computational execution). Let Impl be a computational implementation of the sym-
bolic model M = (C,N,T,D) and Π be a CoSP protocol. For a security parameter η, the computa-
tional challenger ExecM,Impl,Π(η) is an interactive Turing machine defined by repeatedly applying the
rules in Figure 4, starting from the initial state (ν, f, n), where ν is the root of Π, and f and n are
undefined partial functions from node identifiers to bitstrings and from N to bitstrings, respectively.
We call the interaction between ExecM,Impl,Π(η) and an interactive ppt Turing machine A(η) the
computational execution, and denote it as 〈ExecM,Impl,Π(η)‖A(η)〉 using standard notation for in-
teracting machines. The execution stops whenever one of the two machines stops, and the output of
〈ExecM,Impl,Π(η)‖A(η)〉 is the output of A(η).
By Definition 19, there is an efficiently computable injection from V ∪ H into {0, 1}∗, hence we
abuse notation by supplying values from domain in lieu of bitstrings, and using the inverse of this
injection to convert bitstrings back into values from V ∪ H.
The CoSP execution is used in cryptographic reductions; however, CoSP protocols are by definition
infinite. Hence, as is standard in cryptography, we have to ensure the execution of a CoSP protocols is
computable in polynomial-time. To this end, we require that it is possible to incrementally compute
the node information, i.e., the node identifier, for each path through the CoSP protocol in polynomially
many steps (in the length of the path from the root node to the current node). We call such (bi-
)protocols efficient.
Definition 13 (Efficient Protocol). We call a CoSP protocol efficient if:
• There is a polynomial p such that for any node N , the length of the identifier of N is bounded
by p(m) where m is the length (including the total length of the edge-labels) of the path from the
root to N .
• There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, given the identifiers of all nodes and
the edge labels on the path to a node N , computes the identifier of N .
• There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that, given the identifier of a control node N ,
the identifiers of all nodes and all edge labels on the path to N , computes the lexicographically
smallest label of an edge (i.e., the in-metadata) of all edges that lead from N to one of its
successors.
Computational indistinguishability. For computational soundness results of equivalence prop-
erties in CoSP, the notion of computational indistinguishability that is prevalently used in cryptog-
raphy has to be refined to the notion of termination-insensitive computational indistinguishability
(tic-indistinguishability, in short) [12]. In comparison to the standard notion of indistinguishability,
tic-indistinguishability does not require the interactive machines to be polynomial-time, but it instead
2We stress that we not have to incorporate an explicit run-time polynomial to ensure overall termination in polynomial
time, since computational soundness in CoSP is based on tic-indistinguishability, which only requires indistinguishability
for polynomially-long prefixes, see Section 3.4.
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only considers decisions that were made for polynomially-bounded prefixes of the interaction. This
excludes pathological cases in which programs of super-polynomial running time only differ in the
response time (which an adversary might not be able to react to in polynomial time) and in which
cryptographic operations might be executed on inputs of super-polynomial length (for which common
cryptographic definitions do not give any guarantees).
Definition 14 (Tic-indistinguishability). Given two machines M,M ′ and a polynomial p, we write
Pr[〈M‖M ′〉 ↓p(η) x] for the probability that the interaction between M and M ′ terminates within p(η)
steps and M ′ outputs x.
We call two machines A and B termination-insensitively computationally indistinguishable for
a machine A (A ≈Atic B) if for all polynomials p, there is a negligible function µ such that for all
z, a, b ∈ {0, 1} with a 6= b,
Pr[〈A(η)‖A(η, z)〉 ↓p(η) a]
+ Pr[〈B(η)‖A(η, z)〉 ↓p(η) b] ≤ 1 + µ(η).
Here, z represents an auxiliary string. Additionally, we call A and B termination-insensitively com-
putationally indistinguishable (A ≈tic B) if we have A ≈Atic B for all polynomial-time machines A.
For two CoSP protocols Π1,Π2, a symbolic Model M, and implementation Impl, if M and Impl
are clear from the context, we use for ExecM,Impl,Π1(η) ≈tic ExecM,Impl,Π2(η) (for sufficiently large
k ∈ N) the notation Π1≈CoSPc Π2.
3.4 Computational Soundness
The previous notions culminate in the definition of computational soundness for equivalence prop-
erties. It states that the symbolic equivalence of efficient protocols implies their computational indis-
tinguishability.
Definition 15 (Computational soundness). Let a symbolic modelM and a class P of efficient protocols
be given. A computational implementation Impl of M is computationally sound for M if for every
pair Π1,Π2 ∈ P symbolic equivalence Π1≈CoSPs Π2 implies Π1≈CoSPc Π2, i.e., tic-indistinguishability
(see Definition 14) of their computational execution ExecM,Impl,Π1(η) ≈tic ExecM,Impl,Π2(η).
4 Dalvik Bytecode (Review)
The Abstract Dalvik Language (ADL) [4] constitutes the currently most detailed and comprehensive
operational semantics for Dalvik in the literature, even though it does not encompass concurrency and
exceptions (as e.g. in [3]). We refer to Section 8 for further discussion on different Dalvik semantics.
We only provide a compact review of ADL and refer to [4] for more details.
4.1 Syntax of ADL
ADL uses as syntactical domains seven underspecified sets and several sets of unary, binary, and
relation operations.
Definition 16 (Syntactical domains of ADL). The following sets constitute the syntactical domains
of ADL.
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rConst : s −→ s{pp + 1, r[va 7→ n]} for m[pp] = const va, n
rMove : s −→ s{pp+ 1, r[va 7→ r(vb)]} for m[pp] = move va, vb
rUnop : s −→ s{pp+ 1, r[va 7→ u]} for m[pp] = unop va, vb, uop and u = uop(r(vb))
rBinop : s −→ s{pp+ 1, r[va 7→ u]} for m[pp] = binop va, vb, vc, bop and u = r(vb) bop r(vc)
IfTestT : s −→ s{pp+ n} for m[pp] = if-test va, vb, n, rop and r(va) rop r(vb)
IfFestF : s −→ s{pp+ 1} for m[pp] = if-test va, vb, n, rop and ¬(r(va) rop r(vb))
rMoveR : s −→ s{pp+ 1, r[va 7→ r(res lo)]} for m[pp] = move-result va
rISt : s −→ s
{
m′ ·m ·ml, 0 · pp · ppl,
defReg([r(va), . . . , r(ve)]) · r · rl
}
for m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid
m′ = lookup-staticΠ(mid)
rIDR : s −→ s
{
m′ ·m ·ml, 0 · pp · ppl,
defReg([r(vk), . . . , r(vk+n−1)]) · r · rl
}
for m[pp] = invoke-direct-range vk, n,mid
m′ = lookup-directΠ(mid , h(r(vk)).class)
rReturnV :
〈
m ·ml, h, pp · pp′ · ppl, r · r′ · rl, as〉 −→ for m[pp] = return-void and ml′ 6= ()
〈ml, h, (pp′ + 1) · ppl,
r′[res lo 7→ lo(void), resup 7→ up(void)] · rl, as〉
rReturn :
〈
m ·ml, h, pp · pp′ · ppl, r · r′ · rl, as〉 −→
〈ml, h, (pp′ + 1) · ppl, r′[r′′] · rl, as〉
for m[pp] = return va and ml′ 6= ()
r′′ = res lo 7→ lo(r(va)), resup 7→ up(r(va))
rReturnVF : 〈(m), h, (pp), (r), as〉 −→ 〈void, h, as〉 for m[pp] = return-void
rReturnF : 〈(m), h, (pp), (r), as〉 −→ 〈r(va), h, as〉 for m[pp] = return va
for va, vb, vc, vd, ve ∈ X , n ∈ N, mid ∈MID, uop ∈ UNOP, bop ∈ BINOP, rop ∈ RELOP and u ∈ N .
Figure 5: Selection of inference rules that define −→ with uop ∈ UNOP, bop ∈ BINOP, rop ∈
RELOP, with some n ∈ N counter for method calls, some ADL program Π, and some method m.
We write va, . . . , ve for va, vb, vc, vd, ve, and if r = defReg(u1, . . . , ul), then r(vi) = ui for i ∈ {0, . . . , l}
and void otherwise.
CONV : set of symbols for type-casting operations underspecified sets
UNOP := {−,¬} ∪ CONV unary operations CID : set of class names
BINOP := {+,−, ∗, /,%,∧,∨,⊕, <<,>>,>>>} FID : set of field names
binary operations MID : set of method names
RELOP := {=, 6=, <,>,≤,≥} relations S : set of string symbols
X := {vi | i ∈ N} register names N : set of numerical symbols
(e.g., integers and floating point numbers)
Lc : set of constant memory locations
F : set of fields
We require that MID,CID, and FID are mutually disjoint. A given program typically only uses a
subset of the underspecified sets. In these cases, we use the notation Ky to denote that Ky is some
subset of K (Ky ⊆ K) specific to y, for all K ∈ {CID,FID,MID,S,N ,F}.
Many ADL instructions have a -wide variant for 2-register-values and a -range variant where instead
of 5 registers only the starting register and a range n is given and the arguments are read of the n
subsequent registers, beginning from the starting register. Figure 6 depicts the set of ADL instructions
but omits all -wide and -range variants for the sake of readability, as they are treated analogously.
The complete set of instructions can be found in [4].
With the syntactical domains (Definition 16) and the set of instructions (Figure 6) at hand, we
now define the syntax of ADL methods and of ADL programs.
Definition 17 (ADL methods). The set M of ADL methods is defined by M := INST R∗ \ [],
where INST R is the set of instructions (Figure 6).
ADL uses five partial lookup functions. These lookup functions refer to the method names that
return the field (lookup-fieldΠ) and the instruction set with respect to the method’s name: for static
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Arithmetic instructions
move va, vb
const va, n
cmp va, vb, vc
unop va, vb, uop
binop va, vb, vc, bop
Array-related instructions
array-length va, vb
new-array va, vb
filled-array va, vb, vc, vd, ve, n
fill-array-data va, u0, . . . , un
aget va, vb, vc
aput va, vb, vc
Control flow instructions
nop
goto n
if-test va, vb, n, rop
if-testz va, n, rop
Object-related instructions
instance-of va, vb, cl
new-instance va, cl
const-string va, s
const-class va, cl
iget va, vb, fid
iput va, vb, fid
sget va, fid
sput va, fid
Method-related instructions
invoke-virtual va, vb, vc, vd, ve, n,mid
invoke-super va, vb, vc, vd, ve, n,mid
invoke-direct va, vb, vc, vd, ve, n,mid
invoke-interface va, . . . , ve, n,mid
invoke-static va, vb, vc, vd, ve, n,mid
move-result va
return-void
return va
for va, vb, vc, vd, ve ∈ X , n ∈ N, mid ∈ MID, fid ∈ FID, cl ∈ CID, uop ∈ UNOP, bop ∈ BINOP, rop ∈
RELOP, and ui ∈ N ∪ Lc (for i ∈ N0).
Figure 6: The set INST R of ADL Instructions (excluding all -wide and -range variants of commands)
methods (lookup-staticΠ), normal methods (lookup-directΠ), inherited methods (lookup-super), and
virtual methods (lookup-virtualΠ).
Definition 18 (ADL programs). An ADL program Π is a tuple
Π := (CIDΠ,FIDΠ,MIDΠ,MΠ,FΠ,
lookup-fieldΠ, lookup-staticΠ, lookup-directΠ, lookup-superΠ, lookup-virtualΠ),where
CIDΠ ⊆fin CID,FIDΠ ⊆fin FID,MIDΠ ⊆finMID,MΠ ⊆finM,FΠ ⊆fin F ,
lookup-fieldΠ : FIDΠ → FΠ,
lookup-staticΠ :MIDΠ ⇀MΠ,
lookup-directΠ :MIDΠ × CIDΠ ⇀MIDΠ,
lookup-superΠ :MIDΠ × CIDΠ ⇀MIDΠ,
lookup-virtualΠ :MIDΠ × CIDΠ ⇀MIDΠ
4.2 The Semantics of ADL
In this section, we review ADL’s operational semantics as far as needed to understand and state our
results; in particular, we only provide a partial list of ADL’s instructions. We refer to the original
ADL paper for further information [4].
The execution relation defines the operational semantics of ADL. Before we define the execution
relation, we introduce the semantical domains of ADL, A state, also called an intermediate state, in
ADL consists of a heap h, a program counter pp, and a set of register values r1, . . . , rn, and is extended
here by some adversarial state as. Formally defining an ADL state and an ADL program requires
several additional semantical domains sets and functions. First, we define the set of registers. Let
L = Lv∪Lc denote the set of memory locations, where Lv is an underspecified set of variable locations
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and Lc an underspecified set of constant memory locations, with Lv ∩Lc = ∅. For the purpose of this
work, we assume a total order on L. Let V = N ∪ L ∪ {void} denote the set of values, where N is
an underspecified, but finite, set of numerical values and void a distinguished return-value for void-
methods. Let R = N ∪ {res lo , resup} → V be the set of registers, where res lo and resup are reserved
registers for return values (split into an upper and a lower part) of method calls. To define the set of
heap states, let AR = N × (N ⇀ V). Then the set H of heaps is defined as H := (L ⇀ (O ∪ AR)).
Altogether, these notions are referred to as the semantical domains of ADL.
Throughout the paper, we distinguish between configurations and states. A configuration describes
the state of the program without the attacker. Later, we also exclude the state of the library from
the configurations. In ADL, configurations are elements from the set C′. In particular, we distinguish
initial states and initial configurations.
Definition 19 (Semantical domains). The semantical domains of ADL programs are defined by
L = Lc ∪ Lv locations
V = N ∪ L ∪ {void} values
O = CID × (F ⇀ V) objects
AR = N× (N⇀ V) arrays
Xres = {res lo , resup} reserved registers
R = (X ∪ Xres)→ V register states
H = (L⇀ (O ∪AR)) heaps
C′ =M×H× N×R×Q intermediate configuration
C =M×H× N×R×Q intermediate state
Cfinal = V ×H×Q ∪ADVR final state
where Lv with Lv ∩ Lc = ∅ is the set of variable locations, void is a special value such that void 6∈
(N ∪ L), res lo and resup are special registers such that res lo , resup 6∈ X , and Q is the state space of
the adversary (see Section 5.2). Moreover, there is an efficiently computable injection from V ∪H into
bitstrings, which can be efficiently inverted on its range.
The execution relation →. The operational semantics is defined in terms of an execution relation
→ (for an ADL program Π, which we assume fixed in this section). For the sake of illustration,
Figure 5 contains a representative selection of the rules defining →. For the full set of rules, we refer
to the work of Lortz et al. [4].
We use the following notation to shorten presentation and highlight the modifications applied
to the state. For a state s = 〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 ∈ C, we use s{pp+ 1} to denote
〈m ·ml, h, pp+ 1 · ppl, r · rl, as〉. Similarly s{r[v 7→ a]} denotes 〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r[v 7→ a] · rl, as〉,
s{h[l 7→ a]} denotes 〈m ·ml, h[l 7→ a], pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉, s{m′} denotes 〈m′ ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉,
and s{as′} denotes 〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as′〉.
The relation defines constant assignment (rConst), copying of register values (rMove), binary
operations (rBinop), conditional branching (rIfTestTrue and rIfTestFalse). Moreover, we de-
pict rules for static method evaluation (rISt) and evaluation of final methods (rIStR). Return values
are stored in distinct result register res lo , resup ∈ Xres 3(see rReturn).
We slightly diverge from the characterization of method calls in [4] to capture the total number
of computation steps in a run: each transition corresponds to one computation step, and each rule in
Figure 5 is annotated accordingly (−→ instead of →Π).
3Although ADL includes two distinct result registers res lo and resup exist, the upper register resup is only used for
the move-result-wide instruction, where the return value is copied in two parts.
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5 Security framework
We extend ADL with prbabilistic choices and with a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker that is
invoked whenever specific functions are invoked. The modifications to the ADL-semantics are depicted
in Figure 7.
5.1 Execution and communication model
ADL as defined in [4] does not support probabilistic choice and hence no generation of cryptographic
keys and no executions of cryptographic functions. We thus first extended ADL with a rule that
uniformly samples a register value from the set of numerical values N (see the Prob-rule in Figure 7).
To simplify presentation, we interpret the ADL’s semantics as a (generative) probabilistic transition
system, assuming probability 1 and number of computation steps 1 for all transitions in Figure 5
and Appendix A. The symbolic variant of ADL, presented in the next section, will simplify the
adversary by means of a deduction relation, i.e., non-deterministic choice over all message deducible
by the adversary. To be able to capture the non-determinism in the symbolic variant, as well as
the probabilism in the computational variant, we chose a model of a probabilistic transition system
similar to the model introduced by Vardi under the name concurrent Markov chains [13], but recast
in terms of a transition labelled system (as opposed to state labelled), and with the restriction that
probabilistic choices are always unlabelled, which simplifies the definition of parallel composition,
which we will later use to decouple, and substitute attacker as well as library. Hence, the definition of
the distribution of traces below applies to any probabilistic transition system, including the split-state
compositions from Section 7.1. We furthermore annotate both probabilistic and non-deterministic
steps with the number of computation steps in N, to be able to argue about the runtime of a system.
Definition 20 (Probabilistic transition system). A probabilistic transition system is a quadruple
(S, s0,A, δ) consisting of
• a set of states S,
• an initial state s0 ∈ S,
• a set of actions A, and
• a transition function δ : S → D(S × N) unionmulti P(A× S × N).
Given s ∈ S and δ(s) = µ, we write s [p]−→n s′ if µ(s′, n) = p. If (a, s′, n) ∈ δ(s), we write s a−→n s′.
In the first case, we speak of a probabilistic transition (and a probabilistic state s), in the second,
we speak of a non-deterministic transition (and a non-deterministic state s). If a state s is non-
deterministic and δ(s) = ∅, we also call this state final. If a state s is non-deterministic and δ(s)
a singleton set or empty set, or if s is probabilistic and δ(s) is the Dirac distribution, we also call
s deterministic. A probabilistic transition system is fully probabilistic if all of its states are either
probabilistic or deterministic.
Here, D(Ω) denotes the set of all discrete probability distributions on Ω. A discrete probability
distribution on Ω is a function µ : Ω→ [0, 1] such that {x ∈ Ω | µ(x) > 0} (also called the support of
µ, denoted supp(µ)) is finite or countably infinite, and
∑
x∈Ω µ(x) = 1. We use µ(X) as short-hand
for
∑
x∈X µ(x) for X ⊆ Ω. For x ∈ Ω, let µ1x denote the Dirac distribution at x, i.e., the distribution
with µ1x(x) = 1.
Having this model in place, given an ADL program Π, we interpret Π as a transition
system with a transition 〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 [p]−→n 〈m′ ·ml′, h′, pp′ · ppl′, r′ · rl′〉 wherever
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→Π,n,p 〈m′ ·ml, h′, pp′ · ppl, r′ · rl, as ′〉.
Example 1: ADL transition system. Given an ADL program Π, an initial configuration 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉,
and an attacker system (SA, s0A, ∅, δA) in {Aη}η∈N ∈ ADV, let ADLΠ,A,〈ml,h,ppl,rl〉 be the probabilistic
transition system (S, 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 , ∅, δ), where
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• S = C unionmulti Cfinal unionmultiQfinal ,
• s0 =
〈
mk, h, ppl, rl, sA0
〉
,
• δ(s) = µ1s′,1 for s and s′, according to the rules described in Figure 5 and Appendix A (observe
that at most one rule applies to each state, and that each rule uniquely determines the follow-up
state),
• δ(s) = µs,va,N where µs,va,N (s{r[va 7→ n}, 1) = 1N for all n ∈ N , if s matches the pre-condition
of Prob in Figure 7,
• δ(s) = µs,A, where µs,A(s{pp+ 1, r[res lo 7→ lo(res), resup 7→ up(res)], as′}, n + 1) =
Pr[Exec(T ) = 〈(mid , r(va), . . . , r(ve)), as, 〉 →A q1 →A · · · →A qn−1 →A 〈i, as ′, res〉] and
µs,A(〈res〉) = Pr[Exec(T ) = 〈(mid , r(va), . . . , r(ve)), as, 〉 →A q1 →A · · · →A qn−1 →A
〈i, as ′, res〉] for s according to the preconditions of AdvInv and AdvRet in the same figure.
(Note that s ∈ C.)
• δ(〈u, h, as〉) = µas where µas = Pr[Exec(T ) = 〈(), as, 〉 →A q1 →A · · · →A qn−1 →A
〈i, as ′, res〉] and s according to the preconditions of AdvFin. (Note that s ∈ Qfinal .)

Definition 21 (Trace distribution (probabilistic)). Given a fully probabilistic transition system T =
(S, s0, A, δ), where S is finite or countably infinite and  /∈ A, we define Pr[s α−→n s′] = p iff. s [p]−→n
s′ ∧ α =  or s α−→n s′ ∧ p = 1. We define the outcome probability of an execution as follows:
Pr[Exec(T ) = s0
α1−→n1 · · · αn−−→nn sn] =
n−1∏
i=0
Pr[si
αi+1−−−→ si+1].
The probability to reach a certain state within n steps is defined
Pr[T ↓n sm] =
∑
Pr
[
Exec(T ) = s0
α1−→n1 · · · αm−−→nm sm and
m∑
i=1
ni ≤ n
]
,
and the probability of a trace (a1, . . . , an) as
Pr[Traces(T ) = (a1, . . . , an)] =
∑
(α1,...,αm)|A=(a1,...,an)
Pr[Exec(T ) = s0
α1−→m1 · · · αm−−→mm sm].
Notational conventions. Within Pr[·], we abbreviate s α−→n s′ with s α−→ s′ if n = 1. We further-
more use α to indicate a transition that might be unlabelled, i.e., starts from a probabilistic state, in
which case α = . We use a instead of α, to indicate that the parting state is indeed non-deterministic.
5.2 Threat model
In this work, we consider adversaries that are network parties or malicious apps that try to retrieve
sensitive information from an honest app. We model the adversary as an external entity that cannot
run any code within the program and that does not have access to the program’s heap, but can
read input to and control output from a given set of malicious functions ADVR. The attacker is a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A.
We represent the attacker A in ADL as an unlabelled probabilistic transition system. We assume
that each state is a triple, where the first element solely contains the inputs and the last element
contains the outputs. We use the relation→A to denote transitions in the attacker’s transition system
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Prob
m[pp] = rand va n′ ∈ N
s
[
1
|N|
]
−−−−→ s{r[va 7→ n′]}
AdvInv
m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid mid ∈ Malstatic res ∈ V
Pr[Exec(T ) = 〈(mid , r(va), . . . , r(ve)), as, 〉 →A q1 →A · · · →A qn−1 →A 〈i, as′, res〉] = p
s
[p]−−→n+2 s{pp+ 1, r[res lo 7→ lo(res), resup 7→ up(res)], as′}
AdvRet
m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid mid ∈ Malstatic res ∈ ADVR
Pr[Exec(T ) = 〈(mid , r(va), . . . , r(ve)), as, 〉 →A q1 →A · · · →A qn−1 →A 〈i, as′, res〉] = p
s
[p]−−→n+1 〈res〉
AdvFin
Pr[Exec(T ) = 〈(), as, 〉 →A q1 →A · · · →A qn−1 →A 〈i, as′, res〉] = p res ∈ ADVR
〈u, h, as〉 [p]−−→n+2 〈res〉
for va, vb, vc, vd, ve ∈ X .
Figure 7: Inference rules extending ADL with probabilistic semantics and adversarial interaction.
in Figure 7. Many computation models can be expressed this way, including, but not restricted to,
Turing machines.
Whenever a malicious function is invoked, A is executed with its previous state as and the argu-
ments arg of the malicious function. The output of A is the new state as′ and a response-message
res in V, or in the set ADVR, which is distinct from V. If res ∈ V, it is interpreted as the function’s
output values, otherwise, i.e., if the response message is in ADVR, the execution terminates with the
adversarial output res ∈ ADVR. Figure 7 precisely defines this behavior in the rule rInvoke-Adv.
Definition 22 (Attacker). An attacker A is a family of fully probabilistic transition systems (cf.
Definition 20), indexed by a security parameter η ∈ N. For each of theses probabilistic transition
systems (S, s0, ∅, δ), the following holds: S = (Fmal ,V∗)×Q× (V unionmultiADVRunionmulti{}), where Fmal is a set
of malicious functions, Q is the state-space of the adversary, and ADVR are the adversarial outputs,
and each state s in Qfinal ··= {(〈i, q, res〉 | res ∈ ADVR} is final, i.e., δ(s) = ∅. Furthermore (for
simplicity), we assume that every step has computation time 1, i.e., δ(s)(s′, n) = 0 for all n 6= 1.
We define the adversarial computation model as a set of attackers, which we call ADV.
Definition 23. There is a subset of MIDΠ which the adversary controls, called Mal . No element
of Mal is in the range of any lookup-tables lookup-virtual , lookup-static, lookup-direct , lookup-super .
Mal is partitioned into the sets Malvirtual , Mal static, Mal super , and Maldirect .
We obtain the following definition for executing ADL in the presence of an adversary.
Definition 24 (ADL Execution with Adv). Given an ADL program Π, an adversary A, and an initial
configuration 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉, the probability that the interaction between Π on 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 and A
terminates within n steps and results in x is defined as
Pr[〈Π 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 ‖A〉 ↓n x] ··= Pr[ADLΠ,A,〈ml,h,ppl,rl〉 ↓n 〈x〉].
where we write (given A’s initial state as) Π 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 for the program Π with initial state
〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉.
5.3 Calls to crypto APIs
The most direct way of modelling the crypto-API would take the symbolic model as a starting point,
defining static functions without any side-effect, one of which can be used to generate nonces or keys,
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while the others apply constructors or destructors. However, as our results shall be applicable to
Android Apps, we take existing crypto-APIs as the starting point, since the symbolic model is meant
to abstract existing crypto-APIs, rather than demand a “matching implementation”. To this end, it
is worth having a look at how Java’s Standard Cryptography Interface is typically used.
Listing 1: Excerpt from https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Using_the_Java_Cryptographic_
Extensions
KeyGenerator keyGen = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
keyGen.init (128);
SecretKey secretKey = keyGen.generateKey ();
byte[] iv = new byte [128 / 8];
SecureRandom prng = new SecureRandom ();
prng.nextBytes(iv);
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS7PADDING");
c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE ,
secretKey ,
new IvParameterSpec(iv));
byte[] byteCipherText = c.doFinal(byteDataToEncrypt);
We observe that here, c is a function object used for encryption and decryption, which is initialised
with the cypher to be used, mode of operation and additional parameters. Consequently, when
the actual computations are performed in the last line, the fields of this object carry information
important to its operation, not only the arguments supplied. Hence, the cryptographic abstraction of
this library depends not only on the method called (doFinal in this case), but also on the object in the
heap. Moreover, the question which cryptographic abstraction is chosen, e.g., encryption, decryption,
authenticated encryption, etc., depends on object in the heap.
Furthermore, these functions are typically final, meaning that they cannot be overwritten by sub
classes. This is (most likely) compiled to a direct call of said function, implemented in the instruction
invoke-direct-range (see Figure 6). From the point of view of this paper, invokevirtual, invokedirect,
invoke-super and their -range counterparts behave very similarly, which is why we concentrate on
the case relevant for Java’s standard cryptographic interface, i.e., invoke-direct-range . But it is worth
noting, that static function calls (invoke-static ) are not used.
We can also observe, that the randomness used for encryption (iv) is generated using a PRNG, but
user-supplied, while the generateKey method choses a key without exposing the randomness used.
But even for keys, the randomness can be supplied by the user, as demonstrated by the following
(insecure) example.
Listing 2: Excerpt from https://gist.github.com/bricef/2436364
static String IV = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
static String plaintext = "test text 123\0\0\0"; /*Note null padding */
static String encryptionKey = "0123456789 abcdef";
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/NoPadding", "SunJCE");
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(encryptionKey.getBytes("UTF -8"), "AES");
cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE , key ,new IvParameterSpec(IV.getBytes("UTF -8")));
return cipher.doFinal(plainText.getBytes("UTF -8"));
On the other hand, it is also possible to let the Cipher object pick the initialisation vector itself
(and request it via a method call in order to, e.g., attach it to the ciphertext). This is implemented
in Java via overloading, i.e., the method id is known at compile time based on the number and types
of arguments.
To summarize these observations:
• Cryptographic output may depend on values in the heap.
• Which cryptographic abstraction is appropriate may depend on values in the heap, too.
• Cryptographic calls are calls to non-static functions.
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• Cryptographic APIs provide interfaces for random number generation and key-generation with
or without explicit randomness.
We can validate these observations on the open source library bouncycastle4, which is very popular
in mobile applications, as it is fairly lightweight. The interface it provides also permits user-supplied
randomness, while at the same time retaining state within the cipher object.
Listing 3: Excerpt from https://www.bouncycastle.org/specifications.html
BlockCipher engine = new DESEngine ();
BufferedBlockCipher cipher = new PaddedBlockCipher(new CBCCipher(engine));
byte[] key = keyString.getBytes ();
byte[] input = inputString.getBytes ();
cipher.init(true , new KeyParameter(key));
byte[] cipherText = new byte[cipher.getOutputSize(input.length)];
int outputLen = cipher.processBytes(input , 0, input.length , cipherText , 0);
cipher.doFinal(cipherText , outputLen);
Note that it is also possible to use bouncycastle as a security provider for Java’s standard crypto-
graphic interface.
Since randomness might be implicit, or explicit, depending on how a method is called, rather
than mapping methods to (the evaluation of) a constructor or destructor on its arguments, we chose
to generalize this to arbitrary combinations of constructors, destructors and randomness generation.
Symbolic operations (see Definition 5) nicely capture the concept. Hence, a library specification maps
a method and a predicate on the object’s current state (i.e., a subset of O) to a symbolic operation.
The input to the symbolic operation contains the method’s arguments, as well as a defined part of
the heap (cf. Definition 39).
Definition 25 (Library specification). A library specification is an efficiently computable par-
tial function libSpec : MID × O ∪ UNOP ∪ BINOP ∪ RELOP ⇀ SO defined at least on
UNOP ∪ BINOP ∪RELOP.
Note that operations on bitstrings are also specified by libSpec. In Corollary 3 we show that
via symbolic operations, destructors derived from these operations can also be added as destructors
(together with potentially some fresh nonces) to the symbolic model in a computationally sound way.
As we will see later, this allows us to retain more precision, as bitstrings obtained from the crypto-API,
e.g., via decryption, can still be treated as bitstrings.
In order to be able to use an asymptotic security definition, we define uniform families of ADL
programs as programs generated from a security parameter.
Definition 26 (Uniform families of ADL programs). Let Π be an algorithm that, given a security
parameter η, outputs an ADL program. We denote the output of this program Πη and call the set of
outputs of this program a uniform family of ADL programs.
Next, we define initial configurations for families (indexed by a security parameter) of transition
systems as states that are valid initial configuration for all security parameters.
Definition 27 (Initial configuration). Given a family (Tη)η of transition systems. We say that a
state s is an initial configuration for (Tη)η if it is a valid initial configuration for all Tη in this family.
Analogously, we say that a configuration s is an initial configuration for a uniform family of ADL
programs if for all η this s is a valid initial configuration for Πη.
Real-world cryptographic libraries require each cipher before use to be initialised with the key-
length, e.g., the class methods getInstance in javax.crypto.Cipher is called with a string specifying
cipher, mode of operation, key-length and possibly more (see, e.g., Listing 2). Even though the key-
length cannot be arbitrarily large (in fact, the choice is quite limited), we think this comes reasonably
4http://www.bouncycastle.org
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close to how asymptotic security is achieved in real life: when standardisation bodies or security
experts advise developers to chose larger keys, some constant in the existing source code is adapted
to change the parameters to the security library, e.g., in a preprocessor step. We are aware that this
requirement is not met by most real-world cryptographic libraries. Still, we consider this gap between
the actually deployed programs and the theoretical result to be significantly smaller than in previous
results for actual programming languages [6, 14,15].
5.4 Indistinguishability of two ADL programs
Similar to CoSP, we define indistinguishability of ADL programs using tic-indistinguishability [12].
Definition 28 (Indistinguishability (ADL)). We call two uniform families of ADL programs
Π1 = {Πη1}η∈N and Π2 = {Πη2}η∈N with initial configuration s1 = 〈ml1, h1, ppl1, rl1〉 and s2 =
〈ml2, h2, ppl2, rl2〉 computationally indistinguishable for a (not necessarily uniform) family of at-
tackers A = {Aη}η∈N A (written Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc
A
Π2〈s2〉) if for all polynomials p, there is a negligible
function µ such that for all a, b ∈ {0, 1} with a 6= b,
Pr[〈Πη1〈s1〉‖Aη〉 ↓p(η) a] + Pr[〈Πη2〈s2〉‖Aη〉 ↓p(η) b] ≤ 1 + µ(η).
We call Π1〈s1〉 and Π2〈s2〉 computationally indistinguishable (Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc Π2〈s2〉) if we have
Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc AΠ2〈s2〉 for all machines A.
This notion indistinguishability gives rise to notion of non-interference, when Π1 = Π2.
6 Symbolic Dalvik Bytecode
In this section, we define a symbolic variant of ADL, which uses symbolic terms instead of crypto-
graphic values. We sometimes abbreviate this symbolic variant as ADLs. We will show in the next
section that it suffices to analyze a (symbolic) ADLs program in order to prove the corresponding
(cryptographic) ADL program secure, provided that the cryptographic operations used in that pro-
gram are computationally sound, i.e., provided that they have a computationally sound symbolic
model in CoSPin the sense of Definition 15). ADLs’ semantics precisely corresponds to the semantics
of ADL, except for the treatment of cryptographic operations. As a consequence, existing automated
analysis tools can be conveniently extended to ADLs and, thus, accurately cope with cryptographic
operations, since this extension only requires semantic adaptations precisely for those cases where
cryptographic behavior needs to be captured. ADLs is parametric in the symbolic model of the
considered cryptographic operations and, hence, benefits from the rich set of cryptographic primi-
tives that are already supported by computational soundness results in CoSP, such as encryption and
signatures [6–8,10] or zero-knowledge proofs [9, 11].
6.1 Embeddable symbolic CoSP models
We first define sufficient conditions under which a given CoSP model can be embedded into ADL.
To this end, we require that values in N can be embedded into CoSP, i.e., there needs to be an
injective function from N into T, so that, e.g., a register value can be encrypted. As in previous
embeddings [6, 14], we require that the symbolic model includes an equality operation equals.
Definition 29 (ADL-embeddable symbolic model). A symbolic model M = (C,N,T,D) (see Defi-
nition 2) is ADL-embeddable if
• for S = V ∪ H ∪ Mal static ∪ UNOP ∪ BINOP ∪ RELOP ∪ CONV ∪ {0, 1}, there exists an
injective function ι : S → T from S to terms consisting only of constructors, such that all
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n ∈ S can be distinguished using deconstructors, i.e., for each n ∈ S, there are deconstructors
D1, . . . , Dm ∈ D such that for any n′ ∈ S,
D1 ◦ · · · ◦Dm ◦ ι(n′) =
{
ι(n′) if n′ = n
⊥ if n′ 6= n.
We assume the inverse ι−1 on the range of ι to be efficiently computable.
• The destructor distinguishing 0 ∈ S is called iszero.
• There is a destructor equals/2 ∈ D such that for all x, y ∈ T, x 6= y, equals(x, x) = x and
equals(x, y) = ⊥.
• There are pair/2 ∈ C and fst/1, snd/1 ∈ D such that for all , y ∈ T, fst(pair(x, y)) = x and
snd(pair(x, y)) = y.
• For each n-ary operation op ∈ UNOP ∪BINOP ∪RELOP, there is a destructor ops such that
for all a1, . . . , an ∈ V, ops(ι(a1), . . . , ι(an)) = ι(op(ι−1(a1), . . . , ι−1(an))).
We abbreviate n̂ := ι(n), and call n̂ the symbolic representation of n. We lifts this notion to sets:
∀N ⊆ N .N̂ = {n̂ | n ∈ N}.
With Corollary 2, all recent CoSP-results from the literature [6–11] satisfy these requirements. We
show that the first condition of Definition 29 can easily be satisfied for ADL values, if we instantiate
the (underspecified) set V with bitstrings.
Example 2: ADL-embeddable symbolic model for bitstrings and heaps.
Let V = {0, 1}∗, i.e., numerical values, locations (and void) are expressed via bitstrings, but are
distinguishable, i.e., via a tagging convention. We show how an embedding of bitstring can be achieved
with a symbolic model M = (C,N,T,D) which includes
• equals/2 ∈ D such that for all x, y ∈ T, x 6= y, equals(x, x) = x and equals(x, y) = ⊥, and
• string0/1, string1/1, emp/0 ∈ C, unstring0/1, unstring1/1 ∈ D such that for all x ∈ T
unstring0(string0(x)) = x and unstring1(string1(x)) = x,
and in all other cases unstring0(x) = ⊥ and unstring1(x) = ⊥.
In this case, ιV : {0, 1}∗ → T can be defined as follows:
ι(bl . . . b0) := stringbl(stringbl−1(. . . (stringb0(emp)) . . . )).
The symbols in Mal static ∪UNOP ∪BINOP ∪RELOP ∪CONV ∪ {0, 1} can be expressed using
the same method via an embedding into bitstrings, or even simpler, by having one constructor and
one destructor per element, as these sets are a-priori fixed. One could make the same argument for
the heap, but as symbolic abstractions may produce updates to the heap, i.e., “partial” heaps that
overwrite the heap where they are defined (cf. Section 6.2), and symbolic verification tools do not
support arbitrary destructors, we propose a modelling as a list of pairs of argument and function
value. As the heap can contain objects, as well as arrays, these need to be embedded as well. 
For illustration consider the bitstring 01101. Its symbolic representation is the term
t := 0̂1101 = string0(string1(string1(string0(string1(emp))))).
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rIDR-s: s
(LC,mid,r(vk),h|r(vk)),(LR,(ulo ,uup ,h
′))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym for m[pp] = invoke-direct-range vk, n,mid
s
{
h[h′], pp+ 1 · ppl, r[res lo 7→ ulo , resup 7→ uup ] · rl
} ∧O = libSpec(mid, h(r(vk)))
∧ pair(t, h′) = evalO(r(vk), ĥ)
ISt-m: s
(out,mid,r(va),...,r(ve)),(in,(ulo ,uup))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym for m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid
s{pp+ 1 · ppl, r[res lo 7→ ulo , resup 7→ uhi ] · rl} ∧mid ∈ Malstatic ∧ V ′ ` ulo ∧ V ′ ` uup
Unop-m: s
(out,uop,r(vb)),(in,(u,u))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym for m[pp] = unop va, vb, uop
s{pp+ 1 · ppl, r[va 7→ u] · rl} ∧ r(vb) 6∈ TV ∧ V ′ ` u
Unop-l: s
(LC,uop,r(vb)),(LR,(u,u))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym for m[pp] = unop va, vb, uop
s{pp+ 1 · ppl, r[va 7→ u] · rl} ∧ r(vb) ∈ TV ∧ u = duop(r(vb))
Binop-m: s
(out,bop,r(vb),r(vc)),(in,(u,u))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym for m[pp] = binop va, vb, vc, bop
s{pp+ 1 · ppl, r[va 7→ u] · rl} (∧r(vb) 6∈ TV ∨ r(vc) 6∈ TV ) ∧ V ′ ` u
Binop-l: s
(LC,bop,r(vb),r(vc)),(LR,(u,u))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym for m[pp] = binop va, vb, vc, bop
s{pp+ 1 · ppl, r[va 7→ u] · rl} ∧ r(vb), r(vc) ∈ TV ∧ u = dbop(r(vb))
IfTest-m: s
(out,rop,r(va),r(vb))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Sym s
{
(pp+ n′) · ppl, r · rl} for m[pp] = if-test va, vb, n, rop
∧ ¬(r(va) ∈ TV ∧ r(vb) ∈ TV ) ∧ n′ ∈ {n, 1}
for va, vb, vc, vd, ve ∈ X , mid ∈ MID, uop ∈ UNOP, bop ∈ BINOP, rop ∈ RELOP and u, ulo , uup ∈ T.
Figure 8: Modified inference rules of the symbolic execution relation → -Sym, where s =
〈ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl〉. (Variable ranges as in Figure 6.)
If a term t represents the bitstring 01101, the following equality test evaluates to emp:
equals(unstring1(unstring0(unstring1(unstring1(unstring0(t))))), emp)
= equals(unstring1(unstring0(unstring1(unstring1(unstring0(string0(string1(string1(string0(string1(emp)))))))))), emp)
= equals(unstring1(unstring0(unstring1(unstring1(string1(string1(string0(string1(emp)))))))), emp)
= equals(unstring1(unstring0(unstring1(string1(string0(string1(emp)))))), emp)
= equals(unstring1(unstring0(string0(string1(emp)))), emp)
= equals(unstring1(string1(emp)), emp)
= equals(emp, emp)
= emp
In Appendix B, we show that any computationally sound symbolic model that contains symbolic
bitstrings and equality can be extended by destructors implementing any polynomial-time computable
function on bitstrings, allowing us to perform, e.g., binary operations like XOR on the symbolic
representation of bitstrings.
6.2 Semantics of symbolic ADL
The semantical domains of the symbolic variant of ADL coincide with the semantical domains of ADL
except for the set of values V and the set of (intermediate and final) states. The set of values is the
union of symbolic terms and values as defined previously.
We add to each state in the inference rules the list of terms output so far, called the symbolic view.
This symbolic view corresponds to the symbolic view in the symbolic execution of a CoSP protocol
(Definition 6), and is used to track the information the adversary can use to deduce messages.
Definition 30 (Symbolic semantical domains). The symbolic semantical domains of ADL programs
are defined as in Definition 16, with the exception of
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VT = N ∪ L ∪ {void} ∪T values
CT = H× N×R× SViews intermediate states
CTfinal = V ×H× SViews final states
Transition between states are now annotated with the information sent to or received from the
adversary. As ADL is sequential, every output to the adversary is followed by the adversary’s input.
Calls to malicious functions reveal register values to the adversary, which can be terms, locations, or
numerical values. Terms are added to the adversarial knowledge as they are; locations and values are
translated by means of the embedding. Calls to the crypto-API immediately yield a term by applying
a constructor or destructor to the term arguments, or their symbolic representation. As elaborated
in the introduction, applying binary operations (e.g., XOR) to symbolic terms usually invalidates
computational soundness results. We over-approximate this by treating symbolic terms as a blackbox
and let the outcome of any operation involving a symbolic term be decided by the adversary. As a
side effect, we let the adversary learn the operands. As binary operations and tests on bits are only
defined on inputs in N , rules involving these remain unaltered and are complemented by the rules
in Figure 8. For brevity, we let V ′ denote the attacker’s view, which is part of the successor state,
and write V ′ ` m, if the adversary can deduce a term m from a view V , i.e., there is a symbolic
operation O such that O(Out(V )) = m. Observe that for IfTest-m, the adversary can decide the
outcome without learning the operands. This highlights the non-determinism inherent to the symbolic
semantics. We thus define the probabilistic transition system ADLsΠ,〈ml,h,ppl,rl〉 similar to Example 1,
but with these modifications.
With the symbolic semantics in place, we can finally define the notion of symbolic equivalence
between two programs. We first specify what constitutes a symbolic view, as Definition 21 applies
only to fully probabilistic transition systems.
Definition 31 (Symbolic view(probabilistic transition system)). Given a probabilistic (but not nec-
essarily fully probabilistic) transition system T with initial state s0, the set of symbolic views of T is
defined:
SViews(T ) =
{
(α1, . . . , αm)|Views
∣∣∣s0 α1−→n1 · · · αm−−→nm sm}
As in CoSP, we use the equivalence relation on traces introduced in Definition 7.
Definition 32 (Symbolic equivalence). Let M be a symbolic model. Two probabilistic transition
systems T1 and T2 are symbolically equivalent (T1≈SSs T2) if SViews(T1) ∼ SViews(T2) w.r.t. M. Two
uniform families of ADL programs Π1 = {Πη1}η∈N and Π2 = {Πη2}η∈N and initial configurations s1 =
〈ml1, h1, ppl1, rl1〉 and s2 = 〈ml2, h2, ppl2, rl2〉 are symbolically equivalent (Π1〈s1〉≈ADLs Π2〈s2〉) iff,
for each η, the probabilistic transition systems T1 = ADLsΠ1,s1 and T2 = ADLsΠ2,s2 are symbolically
equivalent.
7 Computational Soundness
Establishing a computational soundness proof for ADL requires a clear separation between honest
program parts and cryptographic API calls with their corresponding augmented adversarial symbolic
capabilities. To achieve this, we characterize this partitioning by introducing the concept of a split-
state form of an operational semantics, and we subsequently show that it can be naturally used
to represent ADL. This section, presents the essence of our proof. For the full proofs and detailed
definition, we refer to the technical report [16].
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7.1 Split-state semantics
The split-state form partitions the original semantics into three components, parallely executed asyn-
chronously: (i) all steps that belong to computing cryptographic operations (called the crypto-API
semantics), (ii) all steps that belong to computing the malicious functions (called the attacker seman-
tics), and (iii) all steps that belong to the rest of the program (called the honest-program semantics).
The overall operational semantics is a composition of each of these sub-semantics, i.e., the state space
is the Cartesian product of the sub-states with additional information on which entity is currently
running, defined in terms of asynchronous parallel composition. In a split-state form, all three entities
can synchronize through the following sets of labels: libCall, libResp, out, and in. The first two
model message passing between the honest program and the crypto-API; the latter two model mes-
sage passing between the honest program and the attacker. There is no synchronization step between
attacker and the crypto-API, as the attacker can only stop the execution with a transition of the form
(final,m) for some message m.
The overall operational semantics, called the split-state semantics, will then be defined as the
composition of each of these three sub-semantics, i.e., the state space is the Cartesian product of
the sub-states with additional information on which entity is currently running, defined in terms of
asynchronous parallel composition. The benefit of this notion is that it makes the communication
explicit that occurs between the actual program and the adversary. This communication is often fixed
but arbitrary, i.e., in the case of black-box usage. Moreover, it separates the actual program from the
cryptographic API calls, which is crucial for computational soundness proofs. Finally, the details of
the crypto-API are irrelevant for program analyses, provided that the cryptographic operations are
implemented securely.
Defining split-state. In the first step, we represent the respective program semantics of the adver-
sary, the cryptographic library and the honest programs in terms of three (possibly different) labelled
transition systems. In each of those, every state corresponds to a configuration of the program, the set
of initial states corresponds to the set of initial configurations, and the transition relation is defined by
the set of possible execution steps. Execution steps that involve any of the other entities are labelled
either:
• (LC, f,m) when the honest program makes a library call to the function named f with input m.
• (LR,m) for the library’s response
• (out,m) when the honest program passes message m to the adversary, and
• (in,m) in the opposite case.
We can describe our notion of split-state semantics using the well-studied notion of asynchronous
parallel composition [17,18]5, which we review below. For readability, we define the transition function
in terms of the transition relation it induces.
Definition 33 (Asynchronous parallel composition). The asynchronous parallel composition of two
probabilistic transition systems (S1, s01, A1, δ1) and (S2, s02, A2, δ2) is the probabilistic transition system
(S1 × S2, (s01, s02), (A1 ∩A2), δ), where δ is defined such that:
• (s1, s2) a−→n1+n2 (s′1, s′2) iff s1 a−→n1 s′1, s2 a−→n2 s′2 and a ∈ A1 ∩A2,
• (s1, s2) a−→n1 (s′1, s2) iff s1 a−→n1 s′1 ∧ a /∈ A2,
• (s1, s2) a−→n2 (s1, s′2) iff s2 a−→n2 s′2 ∧ a /∈ A1, and
• (s1, s2) [p]−→n (s′1, s′2) iff s1
[p]−→n s′1 ∧ s′2 = s2 or s2
[p]−→n s′2 ∧ s′1 = s1.
5To be more precise: CSP-style parallel composition on common actions.
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We extend this form of composition to an arbitrary number of transition systems by applying it to
the first and second element, then applying the result to the third, and so forth. We simplify notation
by flattening the resulting state space to S1× S2 · · · × Sn instead of (· · · (S1× S2) · · · )× Sn, modifying
initial configurations and transition relation accordingly.
A split-state composition is an asynchronous parallel composition with the following restrictions:
a) We specify which transitions can be performed in synchronisation. Assuming some set of function
symbols F , some set of symbols for malicious functions Fmal including finalCall, and a domain for
messages D, we define:
out : = {((out, f,m1, . . . ,mn), 1, 1) | f ∈ Fmal ,mi ∈ D}
in : = {((in,m), 1, 1) | m ∈ D}, and
libCall : = {((LC, f,m1, . . . ,mn), 1, 1) | f ∈ F,mi ∈ D},
libResp : = {((LR,m), 1, 1) | m ∈ D},
final = {((final,m), 1, 1) | m ∈ D}.
The first two allow for message passing between the honest program and the cryptographic library,
the latter two for message passing between honest program and attacker. There is no synchronising
step between attacker and library. b) We enrich the three transition system’s state with a boolean
value that indicates whether the system is currently active. Only the active system can perform non-
synchronising steps or decide to pass information to another system via a synchronising step – but in
this case, it activates the other system and ceases to be active itself.
To simplify notation, we write s A−→ s′ if there exists a ∈ A such that s a−→ s′.
Definition 34 (Split-state operational semantics). Given three transition systems (SH , s0H , AH , δH),
(SA, s0A, AA, δA), (SL, s
0
L, AL, δL), such that AH ⊆ out ∪ in ∪ libCall ∪ libResp, AA ⊆ out ∪ in ∪ final,
AL ⊆ libCall∪ libResp, we define the split-state composition as the asynchronous parallel composition
of (B× SH , (>, s0H), AH , δ′H), (B× SA, (⊥, s0A), AA, δ′A), (B× SL, (⊥, s0L), AL, δ′L), where
δ′H(b, s) =

µ ◦ (((>, s), n) 7→ (s, n)) if b = > and δH(s) = µ
((out, finalCall), (⊥, s), 1) if b = > and s final
δH(s)|⊥libCall∪out if b = > and s non-determ. and not final
δH(s)|>libResp∪in if b = ⊥ and s non-deterministic
δ′A(b, s) =

µ ◦ (((>, s), n) 7→ (s, n)) if b = > and δA(s) = µ
δA(s)|⊥in if b = > and s non-deterministic
δA(s)|>out if b = ⊥ and s non-deterministic
δ′L(b, s) =

µ ◦ (((>, s), n) 7→ (s, n)) if b = > and δL(s) = µ
δL(s)|⊥libResp if b = > and s non-deterministic
δL(s)|>libCall if b = ⊥ and s non-deterministic
Here, P |bS is short-hand for {(a, (b, s′), n) | (a, s′, n) ∈ P ∧ a ∈ S}. An operational semantics is a split-
state semantics, if it can be expressed as a split-state composition of three transition systems.
We call states of the honest program semantics configurations, and write T (s) for a split-state
semantics T meaning that the initial state of the honest program semantics TH is replaced by s.
We stress that requiring an out-transition being always followed by a in-transition is without loss
of generality. In case the original would solely send a message or solely receive a message, one of the
transitions would only carry dummy information.
The benefit of this notion is that it makes the communication explicit that occurs between the
actual program and the adversary. This communication is often fixed but arbitrary, i.e., in the case of
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black-box usage. Moreover, it separates the actual program from the cryptographic API calls, which
is crucial for computational soundness proofs. Finally, the details of the crypto-API are irrelevant for
program analyses, provided that the cryptographic operations are implemented securely.
This notion makes these distinction more explicit and facilitates the proof, but note that the
split-state semantics can be defined in a meaningless way: the library could be empty, and never
be called, or return values from the adversary be wholly ignored. We will illustrate in the following
section, however, that through small additions, the ADL semantics can be separated, providing a) for a
generalized proof method, i.e., Lemma 11 and 13 apply to all split-state semantics, not only ADL, b) a
communication model that makes the threat model and the assumptions on the library implementation
obvious.
A split-state semantics is not necessarily a probabilistic transition systems, as the transition sys-
tems it is composed from might be non-deterministic. However, we define the probability of a cer-
tain outcome only for probabilistic split-state semantics, as in most applications for security, non-
determinism in the honest program semantics stems from the modelling of concurrency and is usually
resolved by specifying a scheduler. This non-determinism is typically conservatively resolved by as-
suming that the adversary controls the scheduling.
Definition 35 (Split-state execution). Let TH , TL, TA be transition systems and assume that their
split-state composition T is probabilistic.
We write Pr[T (s0) ↓n x] for the probability that the interaction between between honest program,
attacker and library with initial state s0 ∈ S0 results in x and terminates within n steps, as follows:
Pr[T (s0) ↓n x] =
∑
(s0
α1−→···sk)∈supp(Exec(T ))
Pr
[
Exec(T ) = s0
α1−→n1 s1 · · ·
αk=(final,x)−−−−−−−→nk sk and k ≤ n
]
.
Definition 36 (Split-state indistinguishability). Let TH,1, TH,2, TA, and TL be families of transition
systems indexed by a security parameter in N. We call TH,1 and TH,2 computationally indistinguish-
able for TL and TA and initial states s0H,1, s
0
H,2, sL of TH,1, TH,2, TL (respectively) in the sense of
Definition 27 if for all polynomials p, there is a negligible function µ such that for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}
with a 6= b,
Pr[T η1 ((>, s0H,1), (⊥, (0, z)), (⊥, sL)) ↓p(η) a]
+ Pr[T η2 ((>, s0H,2), (⊥, (0, z)), (⊥, sL)) ↓p(η) b] ≤ 1 + µ(η),
where T η1 is the split-state composition of T
η
H,1, T
η
L, TA, and T
η
2 is the split-state composition of
T ηH,2, T
η
L, TA for security parameter η. In short, we write TH,1(s
0
H,1)≈TL(sL),TAc TH,2(s0H,2). Addition-
ally, we call TH,1 and TH,2 computationally indistinguishable (written as TH,1(s0H,1)≈TL(sL)c TH,2(s0H,2))
if TH,1(s0H,1)≈TL(sL),TAc TH,2(s0H,2) for all TA ∈ ADV ′ and for initial states s0H,1, s0H,2, sL for
TH,1, TH,2, TL (respectively).
7.2 Split-state representation of ADL
We now define the condition necessary for splitting an ADL program into an honest program semantic
and a crypto-API semantics. An ADL program Π is pre-compliant with a crypto-API specification if:
(i) the crypto-API only reads the slice of the heap belonging to its object, i.e., only objects reachable
from locations stored in its own member variables, (ii) the crypto-API never invokes the adversary,
and (iii) only the crypto-API and the adversary make use of the rand-instruction.
Definition 37 (Reachable locations). The set of reachable locations from location l ∈ L in heap h ∈ H
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LibCall : s
(LC,mid,r(vk),...,r(vk+n−1),h|r(vk))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H (wait, s)
for (mid, h(r(vk))) ∈ dom(libSpec)
m[pp] = invoke-direct-range vk, n,mid
LibResponse : (wait, s)
(LR,(mlo ,mup ,h
′))−−−−−−−−−−−−→H s
{
h[h′], pp+ 1 · ppl,
r [res lo 7→ mlo , resup 7→ mup ] · rl
}
for (mid, h(r(vk))) ∈ dom(libSpec)
m[pp] = invoke-direct-range vk, n,mid
LeakMsg : s
(out,mid,r(va),...,r(ve))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H (wait, s)
for mid ∈ Malstatic
m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid
ReceiveMsg : (wait, s)
(in,mlo ,mup)−−−−−−−−−→H s
{
pp+ 1 · ppl, r
[
res lo 7→ mlo ,
resup 7→ mup
]
· rl
}
for mid ∈ Malstatic
m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid
FinalCall : 〈u, h〉 (out,finalCall)−−−−−−−−→H 〈u, h〉
for va, vb, vc, vd, ve, vk ∈ X , n ∈ N, mid ∈ MID, and mlo ,mup ∈ V
Figure 9: ADL split-state representation, honest program semantics, s = 〈ml, h, ppl, r · rl〉
LLibCall : 〈(), ∅, (), (),_〉 (LC,mid,r(v),h)−−−−−−−−−−→L 〈(m), h, (0), (defReg([r(v)])),_〉
for r(v) := r(vk), . . . , r(vk+n−1),
m ··= lookup-directΠ(mid , h(r(vk)).class)
LLibRetVoid : 〈(m), h, (pp), (r),_〉 (LR,(void,void,h))−−−−−−−−−−−−→L 〈(), ∅, (), (),_〉 for m[pp] = return-void
LLibRet : 〈(m), h, (pp), (r),_〉 (LR,(lo(r(va)),up(r(va)),h))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→L 〈(), ∅, (), (),_〉 for m[pp] = return va
for va, vb, vk ∈ X , n ∈ N, mid ∈ MID.
Figure 10: ADL split-state representation, library program semantics, _ is an arbitrary adversarial
state.
is defined recursively:
lreachableh(l) =

l if h(l) ∈ AR
∅ if h(l) undefined⋃
f |F (f)∈L lreachableh(l) if h(l) = (c, F ) ∈ O
Definition 38 (Heap slice). Let h ∈ H = L ⇀ (O ∪ AR) and l ∈ L. We define l’s slice of h as a
partial function on L as follows:
h|l(l′) = h(l′) if l′ ∈ lreachableh(l)
Definition 39 (ADL pre-compliance). An ADL program Π is pre-compliant with a library specification
libSpec, if for each η for the Crypto-API semantics in ADLSSΠη,Aη,s0 (see Definition 40) the following
holds:
• the Crypto-API semantics only reads the slice of the heap belonging to its object, i.e., for all
mid ∈ MID, h1, h2 ∈ H, vk, . . . , vk+n−1 ∈ V, as ∈ Q, u ∈ V, such that (mid , h(r(vk))) ∈
libSpec and m = lookup-directΠ(mid , h(r(vk)).class),
Pr[〈(m), h1[h|vk ], (0), (defReg([rk, . . . , rk+n−1])), as〉 α1−→ · · · αn−−→ 〈u, h1[h|vk ], asn〉] =
Pr[〈(m), h2[h|vk ], (0), (defReg([rk, . . . , rk+n−1])), as〉 α1−→ · · · αn−−→ 〈u, h2[h|vk ], asn〉].
• the Crypto-API semantics never invokes the adversary, i.e., for all mid ∈ MID, h1, h2 ∈ H,
vk, . . . , vk+n−1 ∈ V, va, . . . , ve ∈ V, as ∈ Q, u ∈ V, such that (mid , h(r(vk))) ∈ libSpec and
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ALeakMsg : 〈ε, as, ε〉 (out,mid,va,...,ve)−−−−−−−−−−−−→A 〈(mid , va, . . . , ve), as, ε〉
AReceiveMsg : 〈i, as, res〉 (in,(lo(res),up(res)))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→A
〈
, as′, 
〉
for res ∈ V
AFinal : 〈i, as, res〉 (final,res)−−−−−−→A
〈
, as′, 
〉
for res ∈ ADVR
for va, vb, vc, vd, ve ∈ X , n ∈ N and mid ∈ Mal,
Figure 11: ADL split-state representation, adversary semantics, ε denotes the empty string.
m = lookup-directΠ(mid , h(r(vk)).class),
Pr[ 〈(m), h, (0), (defReg([rk, . . . , rk+n−1〉)), as]→∗ 〈m′ ·ml, h, pp · ppl, rl, as ′〉
∧m[pp] = invoke-static va, . . . , ve,mid ∧mid ∈ Mal static ] = 0, and
• only the Crypto-API semantics and the adversary semantics in ADLSSΠη,Aη,s0 make use of the
rand -instruction, i.e., for any transition s0 →Π,n1,p1 s1 · · · →Π,nl,pl sl to some state sl =
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 with m[pp] = rand va for some va, there is a position in the method
stack, i.e., an i ∈ N and mi · · ·ml′, ri ·rl′ and ppi ·rl′ the ith suffix of ml, rl or ppl, respectively,
such that mi[ppi] = invoke-direct-range vk, n,mid and (mid , h(r(vk))) ∈ dom(libSpec), for some
vk,n and mid , and h the heap when this method was called, i.e., h such that, for the largest
j ∈ {0, l} and some as ′ ∈ Q, sj = 〈mi · · ·ml′, h, ri · rl′, ppi · rl′, as ′〉.
Definition 40 (ADL split-state representation). Given a uniform family of ADL programs Π =
{Πη}η∈N, every member thereof pre-compliant with a crypto-API specification libSpec, a family of
attackers {Aη}η∈N ∈ ADV, and an initial configuration s0 = 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉, we define the ADL split-
state representation (ADLSSΠη,Aη,s0)η∈N as the family of split-state compositions of the following three
transition systems for every η ∈ N:
• honest-program semantics: The transition system (SH , s0H , AH , δH) is defined by the ADL se-
mantics(not including the transitions in Figure 7) , extended with rules in Figure 9, and the
initial state
〈
ml, h, ppl, rl, asHdmy
〉
for an arbitrary initial adversary state asHdmy which will be
ignored.
• crypto-API semantics: The transition system (SL, s0L, AL, δL) is defined by the ADL semantics
except rReturnVF, rReturnF, extended with rules in Figure 7 and Prob (see Figure 10).
The initial state is
〈
(), ∅, (), (), asLdmy
〉
for some arbitrary initial adversary state asLdmy which
will be ignored.
• attacker semantics: The transition system (SA, s0A, AA, δA) consists of the transitions of the
adversary A, extended with the transitions in Figure 11.
To make our notation more concise, we abbreviate the initial state
(>,
〈
ml, h, ppl, rl, asHdmy
〉
), (⊥, sA), (⊥,
〈
(), ∅, (), (), asLdmy
〉
) for some honest initial state
〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 as 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉ss .
Observe that the adversarial steps are explicit in this representation, and hence each step is anno-
tated with a computation time of 1.
Definition 41 (Single-step transition system). A probabilistic transition system is single-step if
s
[p]−→n s′, p > 0 or s a−→n s′ imply n = 1.
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For probabilistic transition steps that are single-step, such as any system that is part of an ADL
split-state representation, we will omit the number of computation steps in each transition from here
forth.
While the overall split-state representation is probabilistic, the honest program semantics is now
deterministic, except for transitions which call the Crypto-API or the adversary. This property is
helpful in formulating the embedding, as this means that from any given state, any follow-up state
up to the point where the Crypto-API or the adversary is called are uniquely defined.
Definition 42 (Internally deterministic). A single-step probabilistic transition system T = (S, s0, A, δ)
is internally deterministic if every probabilistic state is deterministic, and if every non-deterministic
state s is either deterministic, or if for A′ = in and A′ = LR, there are δA′ : S ×A′ → S such that
δH(s) ⊆ {(a, s′, 1) | a ∈ A′ ∧ s′ = δA′(s, a)}.
Lemma 2. The honest-program semantics within any ADL split-state representation is internally
deterministic.
Proof. By definition, the honest program semantics exclude probabilistic transitions. By careful in-
spection, we can verify that all states except those covered by the side-conditions in Figure 9 are
deterministic ( only one inference rule applies to each state, and each rule determines a unique follow-
up state). The rules in Figure 9 are either deterministic, or in case of LibResponse andReceiveMsg,
determine the follow-up state depending on the action.
Lemma 3. For all ADL programs Π that are pre-compliant with a crypto-API specification libSpec,
all initial configurations 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉, all adversaries all n ∈ N, we have
Pr[〈Π 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 ‖A〉 ↓n x] = Pr[T ↓n x],
where T denotes the ADL split-state representation of Π and A for initial configuration 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉.
Proof. We need to show the equivalence between
∑
(s0
α1−→n1
· · · αk−−→ sk)
∈
supp(Exec(ADLΠ,A,〈ml,h,ppl,rl〉))
Pr
[
Exec(ADLΠ,A,sˆ0) = s0
α1−→n1 s1 · · ·
αk−1−−−→nk−1 sk−1 αk−−→nk 〈x〉 ∧
k∑
i=1
ni ≤ n
]
where sˆ0 is the configuration belonging to s0, i.e., s0 without the attacker state, and∑
(s0
α1−→···sk)∈supp(Exec(T ))
Pr
[
Exec(T ) = s0
α1−→n1 s1 · · ·
αk=(final,x)−−−−−−−→nk sk ∧ k ≤ n
]
.
We will prove this equivalence by induction on the length of the execution in ADLΠη , however,
in order to define what it means for two executions to correspond, we partition execution steps into
honest program states, library states, and final states. The initial configuration is an honest program
state by definition. Final states stay final states. Each other state is an honest state, if the previous
state was an honest state and the transition between the two was not an instance of rIDR where
(mid , h(r(vk))) ∈ libSpec. If the previous state was an honest state, but this condition is not true, the
successor state is a library state. Similarly, when the previous state is a library state and the transition
is an instance of rReturnV or rReturn such that the state of the successor state matched the stack
33
of the latest previous state that was not a library state, then the successor is an honest program state,
more formally: if si → si+1 is an instance of rReturnV or rReturn, the last previous honest
program state sj with j < i is such that sj = 〈ml, h, pp · ppl, rl, as〉, then si+1 is a program state if
si+1 = 〈ml, h′, pp+ 1 · ppl, rl′, as ′〉 for some h′, rl′ and as ′.
Given this transition, we define a relation R between executions, which is, for the most part, based
on the resulting state.
• A state s in ADLΠη , which is a final state, i.e., s = 〈res〉 for some res, corresponds to a state
sT = (sH , sA, sL) in T η, if the transition to sT in T η was labelled (final, res).
• A state s in ADLΠη , which is an honest program state of form s = 〈u, h, as〉, corresponds to a
state sT = (sH , sA, sL) in T η, if sH = (>, 〈u, h〉) and sA = (⊥, 〈, as, 〉).
• A state s in ADLΠη , which is an honest program state 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉 corresponds to state
(sH , sA, sL) iff. sH = (>, 〈mlH , hH , pplH , rlH , asH〉), sL = (⊥, 〈mlL, hL, pplL, rlL, asL〉), sA =
(⊥, (in, as, out)), and
– ml = mlH ,
– h = hH ,
– ppl = pplH ,
– rl = rlH .
• A state s in ADLΠη , which is a library state 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉 corresponds to state
(sH , sA, sL) iff. sH = (⊥, 〈mlH , hH , pplH , rlH , asH〉), sL = (>, 〈mlL, hL, pplL, rlL, asL〉),
sA = (⊥, (in, as, out)), and
– ml = mlL ·mlH , where mlL 6= ,
– h = hH [hL],
– ppl = pplL · pplH ,
– rl = rlL · rlH .
– mlH = mlenter , rlH = rlenter and ppl = pplenter for si = 〈mlenter , hi, pplenter , rlenter , asi〉,
i < k the last program state such that si+1 and all subsequent states were library states
Fix n. We show by induction on number k of steps in execution: For any execution of k′ =
∑k
i=0 ni
steps that ends in a state 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉 in ADLΠη , the sum of probabilities of all executions of k′
steps in T η that ends in a corresponding state is exactly the same. Note that for a 6= a′, aRb implies
¬(a′Rb), hence this implies the claim.
Initially, this is the case, because if 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, (η, z)〉 in ADLΠη , then sH = (>, 〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉),
sL = (⊥, (, ∅, , , asdmy)) and sA = (⊥, (η, z)). (W.l.o.g., we use asdmy for asLdmy or asHdmy , depending
on context.)
Assume the induction hypothesis (IH) holds for k steps, i.e., up to a state sk in ADLΠη . We
perform a case distinction on sk.
If sk is a library state, it has the form sk = 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉, as the rules rReturnVF and
rReturnF are not part of the library semantics. Thusml = ml′·mlenter for some non-empty sequence
ml′, as rReturnV, rReturnVF, rReturn and rReturnF are the only rules reducing the method
stack, but if one of them would have been applied, sk would not be a library state. By IH, we have
that ml = mlL ·mlH , and mlH = mlenter so any rule that does not alter the method stack preserves
the correspondence, given that Πη is pre-compliant (see Condition 39). This holds for method calls to
honest libraries, too, as they extendml and, likewise, mlL to the left. Method call to the adversary are
excluded by Condition 39. As sk’s frame is of length at least 2, rReturnVF rReturnF never apply.
Consider now the two remaining cases, where either rReturnV or rReturn are applied. We treat
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only the latter, as the former is completely analogous. Let sk = 〈m ·ml′, h, pp · ppl, r · r′ · rl, as〉 for
ml′ 6=  and m[pp] = return va. As m ·ml′ = mlL ·mlenter , either mlL = (m) and thus ml′ = mlenter ,
or |mlL| > 1. In the first case, mlL = (m), only LLibRetVoid or LLibRet (depending in m[pp])
apply. These are labelled (LR, lo(r(va)), up(r(va)), h) with probability 1 and 1 computation step. By
asynchronous parallel composition, the the honest program semantics moves with rule LibResponse.
The following state is thus an honest program state, and relation holds. In particular, the library’s
heap overwrites the honest program’s, thus it holds that h′ = h (by definition of the transition),
h = hH [hL] (by IH) hH [hL] = h′H (by LibResponse) and thus h
′ = h′H . In the second case,
|mlL| > 1, rReturnV (or rReturn) are used in both cases, preserving the IH. It is not possible to
enter a final state from sk, as rReturnVF and rReturnF only apply if the method stack is of size
1.
If sk is an honest program state, it has the form sk = 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉, or sk = 〈u, h, as〉. In
the second case, sk = 〈u, h, as〉, the only applicable rule is AdvFin, resulting in a transition labelled
(final, res). to state 〈res〉, for the sum of all probabilities of adversary steps that go from A to res in
n steps, for some n. Let p be this sum. The only applicable rule in T η is FinalCall, which has label
(out, finalCall) and thus executes ALeakMsg in parallel. There is a set of corresponding executions
of the adversary for each nk, the sum of which has probability p, as the number of steps, starting
states and final step are the same. Including the final step AFinal (which is always applicable when
the third element of the triple is in ADVR, and excludes AReceiveMsg), each of these results in a
transition (final, res). for n+ 2 steps. Now we consider the first case, sk = 〈ml, h, ppl, rl, as〉. Let the
transition to sk+1 be an instance of rIDR where (mid , h(r(vk))) ∈ libSpec. Then, the next state is
a library state sk′ = 〈m′ ·ml, h, 0 · ppl, defReg([r(vk), . . . , r(vk+n−1)〉) · rl, as] For each corresponding
state in T η, LibCall in parallel with LLibCall is the only transition possible in T η. By asyn-
chronous parallel composition, each follow-up state will be such that sH = (⊥,ml, h, ppl, rl, as ′),
sL = (>, (m), h|r(vk), (0), defReg([r(vk), . . . , r(vk+n−1)]), as ′′), and sA = (⊥, in, as, out for some
as ′, as ′′ ∈ ADVR, in ∈ (Fmal ,V∗), and out ∈ ×(V ∪ ADVR ∪ {}). These library states corre-
spond to each other, in particular, h = hH = hH [hL] = hH [h|r(va)], and ml = mlenter , ppl = pplenter ,
rl = rlenter . Let the transition be an instance of the rule AdvInv with probability p in n steps.
Similar to the previous case involving the attacker, the sum of all possible transitions in n + 1 steps
from (sH , sA, sL), equals p, as only rules LeakMsg and ALeakMsg apply (in parallel). The adver-
sary is activated on same input, i.e., all instances of states (i, as, res with res ∈ V, reachable in T
synchronise with ReceiveMsg by definition of AReceiveMsg and Definition 22. The number of
computation steps account for the extra activation with ReceiveMsg in parallel with ReceiveMsg.
Let the transition be an instance of the rule AdvInv with probability p in n steps. Similar to the
previous case, where AdvInv was invoked from a library state, this transition is labelled (final, res).
and results in a state 〈res〉, for the sum of all probabilities of adversary steps that go from A to res in
n steps, for some n. The argument remains the same. Note that the adversary produces a final state
(which cannot have successor, by Definition 22), thus there is no final state before any final state.
Hence LeakMsg and ALeakMsg synchronise as before, and AFinal is the only way to proceed
from final state. If the transition was an instance of Prob, by Condition 39, Definition 39, sk would
not be an honest-program state. Any other transition affects only the left-most element of ml, ppl
and rl, thus the same transition can be applies in T η.
If sk is a final state, there is no next step in sk and all corresponding states. This concludes the
proof.
7.3 Over-approximating ADL
Recall that our plan is to instantiate Dc with symbolic terms and even with positions in a CoSP
tree. However, some operations are not defined on symbolic terms. As an example consider the XOR
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operation. It has been shown that each computationally sound symbolic representation of XOR has
to work on symbolic bitstrings. Hence, for a typical symbolic representation of a ciphertext the XOR
operation is not defined in the symbolic model.
In order to get rid of any undefined operations after instantiating Dc with symbolic terms or
CoSP tree positions, we over-approximate each undefined operation by querying the attacker for the
result. To this end, we define an over-approximation of the ADL semantics in terms of its split-
state representation. This over-approximation tracks values resulting from calls to the crypto-API.
Whenever a computation, e.g., a unary operation, a binary operation or a test, is performed on
these values, the over-approximation gives the adversary more power: she can decide the values of
these computations. This is necessary, as these operations cannot be computed in the symbolic
model. Already performing this over-approximation on the ADL split-state semantics simplifies the
embedding. Thanks to the split-state composition, we can define this over-approximation canonically.
D
(e.g., V)
Dc
(e.g., T)
Db
(e.g., ι(V))
inject.
⊆
biject.
Figure 12: Domains of the canonical over-approximation.
We assume some domain D underlying the transition function and the set of states of the honest
program semantic, and a distinct new domain Dc (for values resulting from the crypto API), a subset
of which Db ⊂ Dc (representation of bitstrings) have a bijection to the original domain (see Figure 12).
We assume the honest-program semantics to be defined via a set of rules, and interpret these rules in
the new domain Dc. If the re-interpreted rule can be instantiated regardless of whether some state
carries values in D or Dc, this rule is transferred to the over-approximated semantics. Most rules only
move values from registers to heaps and are homomorphic in this sense. Rules for which the above do
not hold, but which can be expressed using a constructor or destructor, are split into four rules, two
of which send these values to the adversary and use her input for the follow-up state in case one of the
variables is in Dc \ Db. Otherwise, i.e., if only values from D are used, or values representable in D,
then the crypto-API is used for the computation. This way, we were able to encode binary operations
like XOR as destructors, so representations of bitstrings that have passed the crypto API (e.g., a
bitstring was encrypted and then decrypted again) can be treated without unnecessary imprecision.
If any rule r ∈ RH falls in neither of the above cases, the canonical over-approximation is undefined.
Using this over-approximation, we can derive ADLoSS , the over-approximated ADL semantics.
We tag messages resulting from calls to the crypto-API using a set Nc, such that Nc ∩ N =
∅, and assume a bijection between the two that is efficiently computable. For n ∈ Nc ∪ N ,
let [n]Nc and [n]N denote its representation in Nc or N according to the bijection. We lift
this notation to values in V, too. The inference rules include those previously defined, but
modified such that register values are converted to N before addressing the crypto-API, i.e.,
LC(f, r(va), . . . , r(ve)) is substituted by LC(f, [r(va)]Nc , . . . , [r(ve)]Nc), and out(mid , r(va), . . . , r(ve))
is substituted by out(mid , [r(va)]Nc , . . . , [r(ve)]Nc). Finally, the rules in Figure 13 are added.
Precise treatment of bitstring representations output by Crypto-API. If some value was
produced by the Crypto-API, e.g., an encryption, in ADLs, it will be represented by a symbolic term,
e.g., enc(k,m) for some terms k and m. When enc(k,m) is tested for equality to a bitstring, there
is no meaningful way to decide for the outcome of this test. To simplify the next proof steps, we
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Cmd: m[pp] = unop va, vb, uop
r(vb) 6∈ N ′c
=⇒ (l1, l2) = (LC, LR)
r(vb) ∈ N ′c
=⇒ (l1, l2) = (out, in)
Unop-l1: s
(l1,uop,r(vb))−−−−−−−−−→H s
Unop-l2: s
(l2,u)−−−−→H s{r[va 7→ u]}
Cmd: m[pp] = binop va, vb, vc, bop
¬(r(vb), r(vc) ∈ N ′c)
=⇒ (l1, l2) = (LC, LR)
r(vb), r(vc) ∈ N ′c
=⇒ (l1, l2) = (out, in)
Binop-l1: s
(l1,bop,r(vb),r(vc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H s
Binop-l2: s
(l2,u)−−−−→H s{r[va 7→ u]}
Cmd: m[pp] = if-test va, vb, n, rop
¬(r(va), r(vb) ∈ N ′c)
=⇒ (l1, l2) = (LC, LR)
r(va), r(vb) ∈ N ′c
=⇒ (l1, l2) = (out, in)
T1-l1: s
(l1,rop,r(va),r(vb))−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H s
T2-l1: s
(l2,x)−−−−→H s{pp+ n}, if x = r(va)
T3-l1: s
(l2,x)−−−−→H s{pp+ 1}, if x = ⊥
LibCall′ :s
(LC,mid,[r(vk),...,r(vk+n−1),h|r(vk)]D)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H s for m[pp] = invoke-direct-range vk, n,mid
(mid, h(r(vk))) ∈ libSpec
Figure 13: over-approximated honest program semantics for ADL (ADLoSS ). Here Nb := range(ι)
and N ′c := Nc \ Nb.
over-approximate in these situations, even though we have not made the transition into the symbolic
model yet. But not every output from the Crypto-API should be over-approximated in this. Consider
the following example: a bitstring is encrypted by the Crypto-API, stored and later decrypted again.
The result of this decryption is very well a library output, but it is perfectly feasible to compute
equivalence to a second bitstring. It should not be necessary to send the bitstring to the adversary in
this case. In terms of the symbolic model, the bitstring would be represented as outlined in Example 2
on page 25. Each bitstring has a unique term representation, thus there exists a subset of T which is
bijective to the set of bitstrings. In general, we assume a subset of Dc, called Db, which is injective
to the original domain D. If an operation, e.g., a binary operation like XOR, is to be applied to two
values in Db, we require the library to compute this operation. For all relevant operations in ADL,
this is possible w.l.o.g (see Appendix A. We thus obtain a relatively precise over-approximation.
Rules. We assume the transition relation to be defined in terms of a set of inference rules employing
(meta-language) variables parametric in some domain D. We say we interpret a rule in the domain
D′, if we alter the domain of each variable in D to D′. Naturally, this might lead to rules that cannot
be satisfied any more, e.g., if D = R and a premise requires a variable v ∈ R to equal pi, the same rules
interpreted in the domain D′ = N are unsatisfiable. However, most rules defining the ADL semantics
can be re-interpreted easily. Many of them move values from one register to another, or from heap to
registers and are thus oblivious of the actual type of data moved. If a transition from a state s to a
state s′ is possible with, e.g., rMove, and there is a well-defined mapping from states in the domain
D = V to states in any other domain D′, then an interpretation of rMove in D’ can be instantiated
for s and s′ mapped to D′.
Some ADL rules, e.g., rBinop, cannot be re-interpreted for an arbitrary D. In this case, the
operation bop is only defined on values in V, more preciselyN . Hence the predicate x = r(va) bop r(vb)
is unsatisfiable if r(va), r(vb) /∈ V. As mentioned before, we can deal with this, by a) transforming
r(va) and r(vb) to Db and sending them to the library, if they are in D or Db, or b) sending them
r(va) and r(vb) if they are in Dc \ Db, i.e., if it is not clear how to evaluate this operation.
We define this over-approximation for any semantics in split-state form as follows. Here we benefit
from the split-state composition, as it allows for rewriting rules in a way that involves the attacker,
or the Crypto-API. The over-approximated ADL semantics is an instance of the canonical over-
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approximation.
Definition 43 (Crypto-API space). Let D be any set. A pair of domains (Dc,Db) is a Crypto-API
space, if
• Dc ∩ D = ∅,
• there is an injection f from D to Dc, and
• Db ⊂ Dc, and
• there is a bijection b between D and Db.
In addition, we use the following notation for all d ∈ D ∪ Db:
[d]D =
{
d if d ∈ D
b−1(d) if d ∈ Db
[d]Db =
{
b(d) if d ∈ D
d if d ∈ Db
[d]Dc =
{
f(d) if d ∈ D
d if d ∈ Dc
We lift this notation to finite sets, tuples and sequences.
Definition 44 (Canonical over-approximation (honest program sementics)). Let (Dc,Db) be a Crypto-
API space for D and D′ := D∪Db∪Dc. Given a symbolic modelM = (C,N,T,D), and an internally
deterministic transition system TH with →H defined in terms of a finite set of inference rules RH ,
which are parametric in a domain D, we define →H′ from the set of inference rules RH that defines
→H :
(i) Each rule r ∈ RH , for which any instance with domain D that concludes s (l,1,1)−−−−→H s′ for some
s and s′, can be instantiated with domain Db to conclude [s]Db
(l,1,1)−−−−→H′ [s′]Db , and with domain
Dc to conclude [s]Dc
(l,1,1)−−−−→H′ [s′]Dc , is part of the rules when interpreted with domain Dc (which
Db is a subset of).
(ii) Each rule R ∈ RH , for which the above does not hold, but for which there is a symbolic operation
O ∈ SO such that it has the form
R =
φ(s) ∧ ρ(s, s′) ∧ Pr [[r]Db = AO([v1, . . . , vl]Db)] = 1
s
(ε,1,1)−−−−→H s′
for variables v1, . . . , vl in s, and variables r in s′, we define four rules:
φ([s]D) ∧ ¬(v1, . . . , vl ∈ D ∪ Db)
s
((out,O,v1,...,vl),1,1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H′ s
φ([s]D) ∧ ρ′([s]D, [s′]D) ∧ ¬(v1, . . . , vl ∈ D ∪ Db)
s
((in,r),1,1)−−−−−−→H′ δin(s, r) = s′
φ([s]D) ∧ v1, . . . , vl ∈ D ∪ Db
s
((LC,O,[v1]Db ,...,[vl]Db ),1,1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→H′ s
φ([s]D) ∧ ρ([s]D, [s′]D) ∧ v1, . . . , vl ∈ D ∪ Db
s
((LR,r),1,1)−−−−−−→H′ δLR(s, r) = s′
If any rule r ∈ RH falls in neither of the above cases, the canonical over-approximation is unde-
fined. Otherwise, the canonical over-approximation of the honest program semantics TH for Crypto-
API space (Dc,Db) is the transition system
T ′H := ([SH ]D′ , [S
0
H ]D′ ,→H′).
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Definition 45 (Canonical over-approximation). Given a symbolic model M = (C,N,T,D), and a
split-state composition T of an internally deterministic transition system TH , and transition systems
TA and TL, such that T is probabilistic, let T ′H , the canonical over-approximation of the honest program
sementics TH , be defined.
Then, the canonical over-approximation of T for the Crypto-API space (Dc,Db) is the split-state
composition of T ′H , TA, T
′
L, where
T ′H := ([SH ]D′ , [S
0
H ]D′ ,→H′)
T ′L := (SL, S
0
L,→L′)
with s
(LC,f,[v1]Db ,...,[vl]Db )−−−−−−−−−−−−−→L′ s′ if s (LC,f,v1,...,vl)−−−−−−−−→L s′ and s α−→L′ s′ if s α−→L s′ and α 6∈ libCall.
Lemma 4. For any split-state composition T from an honest program TH , and some attacker and
library transition system, the honest program semantics T ′H = (S
′
H , S
0′
H ,→′H) resulting from the canon-
ical over-approximation of T to the crypto-API space (Dc,Db) are internally deterministic, if TH is
internally deterministic.
Proof. Consider the subset of the rules defining →′H that are just re-interpreted according to Condi-
tion i, Definition 45. If the transition relation relating from this subset was not internally deterministic,
TH would not have been internally deterministic, as the mapping from D to Dc is injective. Consider
now any additional rule derived according to Condition ii, Definition 45. Either the first and second
rule applies, or the third and fourth, as their premises are mutually exclusive on the state. By defini-
tion of these rules, the follow-up state s′ depends only on s and value r ∈ D′ contained in the label.
It is left to show that no state s to which any of these four rules can be instantiated, is covered by
any rule resulting included according to Condition i, Definition 45, or by another rule resulting fro
Condition ii. In the both cases, this would imply that TH was not internally deterministic, in the first
case directly, in the second case because the same predicate on s is in the premise of all four translated
rules.
Lemma 5. For any split-state composition T from an honest program TH = (SH , S0H ,→H), an
attacker TA, and a library transition system TL = (SL, S0L,→L), if
• Pr[s (out,O,u1,...,ul)−−−−−−−−−→H s′] = 0 and Pr[s (LC,O,u1,...,ul)−−−−−−−−−→H s′] = 0 for any two states s, s′ ∈ SH and
any sequence u1, . . . , ul, and
• Pr[s (LC,O,v1,...,vl)−−−−−−−−−→L→∗ (LR,[AO(v1,...,vl)]D)−−−−−−−−−−−−→L s′] = 1 for any s′ ∈ SL and any s for which holds
s ∈ S0L or Pr[s′ libResp−−−−−→ s] 6= 0.
then there is an attacker T ′A such that for the canonical over-approximation T
′ from TH , TL and T ′A,
and for all η, n ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
Pr[T (〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉 , (⊥, (η, z)), 〈(), ∅, (), (), asdmy〉) ↓n x] =
Pr[T ′([〈ml, h, ppl, rl〉]Db , (⊥, (η, z)), ((), ∅, ()(), asdmy)) ↓p(n) x].
for some polynomial p.
Proof. Let T ′A be TA, with all transitions of form (out, O, . . .) for O ∈ SO removed, and all transitions
labelled (libCall, f, u1, . . . , ul) for f 6∈ SO interpreted with [u1, . . . , ul]D instead of u1, . . . , ul in the
successor state. We show that for any transition from step (sH , sA, sL) to (s′H , s
′
A, s
′
L in T , there is a
sequence of transitions with the same overall probability (i.e., the product of their probabilities) from
([sH ]Db , sA, sL) to ([s′]Db , s′A, s
′
L) in T’. Initially, this holds by definition of the initial state. Inductive
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step. Let the honest program be active. For any transition described by the transformation i, this
holds immediately, unless the adversary or the library is called. If the adversary is called, observe that,
by assumption one, the adversary is never invoked on (out, O, . . .) for O ∈ SO, so TA differs only in the
transformation, from Db to D, which, by bijection, produces the same follow-up state. If the library
is called, the same argument is made by definition of the library semantics of the over-approximation
from Definition 45. transformation ii, consider the instantiation of R that applies from sH to s′H . By
definition of [·]Db , the first two rules derived from R never apply, but the third applies. By assumption
two and the definition of split-state composition, T ′ proceeds with probability 1 until the fourth rule
applies. In particular, the same predicates hold, and, as in the previous case, by the fact that D
and Db are bijective, and by definition of the over-approximated library semantics in Definition 45,
the library transitions operate on the same internal states. The resulting state contains r ∈ D, i.e.,
the original domain, which is left intact by the conversation [s′]D. In the last case, the library or
the attacker is active. If no message is passed to the honest program, the the induction hypothesis
is trivially preserved. If a message is passed to the honest program, the honest program needs to
have a transition with a label in in or libResp, and as TH needs to be internally deterministic for the
over-approximation to be defined, this transition is an instance of a rule that matches Condition i.
By the transformation applied to these rules, the values in D are correctly translated to on reception
Db.
Definition 46 (Harmonizing Crypto-API). A Crypto-API TL := (SL,S0L,→L) harmonizes with a
computational implementation Impl of a symbolic model M and a libSpec, if
Pr
[
∃s′ ∈ S0L.s
((LC,op,u1,...,ul),1,1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→L′→∗ ((LR,r),1,1)−−−−−−→L s′
]
= Pr
[
AlibSpec(op)(u1, . . . , ul) = r
]
and
Pr
[
∃s′ ∈ S0L.s
((LC,f,u1,...,ul,h),1,1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→L′→∗ ((LR,r),1,1)−−−−−−→L s′
]
= Pr
[
AlibSpec(f,h(u1))(u1, . . . , ul, h) = r
]
for any s for which s ∈ S0L or Pr[s′ libResp−−−−−→ s] 6= 0.
Definition 47 (Crypto-API compliance). An ADL program Π is compliant with a library specification
libSpec w.r.t. a symbolic modelM and a computational implementation ofM called Impl, if Π is pre-
compliant (see Definition 39), and there is a Crypto-API TL := (SL, S0L,→L) such that TL harmonizes
with Impl (see Definition 46).
Example 3: ADLo: over-approximated ADL semantics. We use the canonical over approximation to
define ADLoSS , the over-approximated version of the ADL split-state semantics. Let D = V ∪H, and
(Dc,Db) any Crypto-API space for D. This can, for example, created by tagging library output, and
thus having Db = Dc. Given a uniform family of ADL programs Π = {Πη}η∈N, every member of which
is pre-compliant with a library specification libSpec, and a family of attackers A = {Aη}η∈N ∈ ADV,
we call the canonical over-approximation of the ADL split-state representation (see Definition 40) the
over-approximated ADL semantics, denoted ADLoSSΠ,A,s0 = (ADLo
SS
Πη,Aη,s0)η∈N. 
Corollary 1. For any ADL program Π compliant with a library specification libSpec and a symbolic
model M, and an attacker A, there is an attacker A′ and a polynomial p such that for all n:
Pr[ADLSSΠ,A,s0 ↓n x] = Pr[ADLoSSΠ,A′,s0 ↓p(n) x].
We define the the split-state equivalence for ADL.
Definition 48 (ADL split-state equivalence). Let Π1 and Π2 be two families of ADL programs com-
pliant with the same library specification libSpec and s1, s2 initial configurations for Π1 and Π2, respec-
tively. We write Π1〈s1〉≈SSc Π2〈s2〉, if, for all adversaries A ∈ ADV, for the over-approximated ADL
split-state representations (ADLoSSΠη1 ,Aη,s1)η∈N of Π1〈s1〉 and A, and (ADLo
SS
Πη2 ,Aη,s2)η∈N of Π2〈s2〉 and
A, we have TH,1(s1)≈TL,TAc TH,2(s2).
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Finally, we are in a position to connect the ADL semantics to the over-approximated split-state
form.
Lemma 6. Let Π1 and Π2 be two families of ADL programs pre-compliant with the same library specifi-
cation libSpec and s1, s2 initial configuration for Π1 and Π2, respectively. Then Π1〈s1〉≈SSc Π2〈s2〉 =⇒
Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc Π2〈s2〉.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3 and Corollary 1.
7.4 Canonical symbolic semantics
The canonical over-approximated split-state semantics define a canonical symbolic semantics, when
the Crypto-API space Dc is instantiated with the set of terms defined by the CoSP-symbolic model
M (in which our result in parametric), when the attacker semantics is given by the symbolic attacker
from M, and when the crypto-API is simplified to the constructors and destructors in M.
Definition 49 (Canonical symbolic split-state semantics). Given a symbolic modelM = (C,N,T,D),
a subset Tb ⊂ T such that (T,Tb) constitute a Crypto-API space, a split-state semantics T with
an honest-program semantics TH , and an attacker strategy, i.e., a sequence I ∈ AttS for AttS =
{(in, O) | O ∈ SO} (see Definition 6), the canonical symbolic split-state semantics of T w.r.t. (T,Tb)
and I is the split-state composition of
• the canonical over-approximation of the honest program semantics for Crypto-API space (T,Tb)
(see Definition 44),
• the attacker semantics (SI , S0I ,→I) with state space SI ··= AttS × Event∗out × (T ∪ {⊥}), initial
state S0I = (I, ,⊥) ( ∈ Event∗out), and →I the smallest relation such that
((in, O) · IL, V,⊥) (out,mid,u1,...,ul)−−−−−−−−−−−→I,1,1 (IL, V ′, evalO(Out(V ′))) for V ′ = V · (out, m̂id , û1, . . . , ûl)
(IL, V, pair(ulo , uup))
(in,ulo ,uup)−−−−−−−→I,1,1 (IL, V,⊥),
• and the Crypto-API semantics (SL, S0L,→L) with state space SL = T3∪{⊥, }, initial state space
S0L =  and →L the smallest relation such that:

(LC,mid,u1,...,ul,h)−−−−−−−−−−−−→L,1,1 (tlo , tup , th, ) if pair(tlo , pair(tup , th)) = evalO(m̂id , û1, . . . , ûl, ĥ)
or tlo = tup = th = ⊥ if evalO(m̂id , û1, . . . , ûl, ĥ) = ⊥
(tlo , tup , th)
(LR,(tlo ,tup ,th))−−−−−−−−−→L,1,1 .
We can define the ADL symbolic split-state semantics as an instance of the canonical symbolic
semantics.
Definition 50 (ADLsSS , ADL symbolic split-state semantics). Let Tb be the domain of ι (see Defi-
nition 29) and observe that (T,Tb) constitute a Crypto-API space. For Π a uniform family of ADL
programs, every member of which is pre-compliant with a library specification libSpec, the ADL sym-
bolic split-state semantics of Π w.r.t. an attacker strategy I is the canonical symbolic split-state
semantics of the ADL split-state representation (see 40) w.r.t. (T,Tb) and I.
Note that, given a program Π and an attacker strategy I, the ADL symbolic split-state semantics
of Π w.r.t. I is deterministic.
We show that the ADL symbolic split-state semantics can be trivially simplified to the semantics
presented in Section 6.
We define symbolic equivalence in the spirit of Definition 9 with equivalence of views defined as in
Definition 8.
41
Definition 51 (Symbolic equivalence ≈SSs ). Two ADL programs Π1 and Π2, and initial configu-
rations s1 = 〈ml1, h1, ppl1, rl1〉 and s2 = 〈ml2, h2, ppl2, rl2〉 are symbolically split-state equivalent
(Π1〈s1〉≈SSs Π2〈s2〉) if for all attacker strategies I, their respective ADL symbolic split-state semantics
T1, T2 w.r.t. to I are symbolically equivalent, i.e., if SViews(T1) ∼ SViews(T2).
Now we are ready to state that symbolic equivalence in the split-state setting implies symbolic
equivalence in the sense of Definition 9, or in other words, symbolic equivalence with respect to the
semantics introduced in Section 6.
Lemma 7. Let Π1 and Π2 be two ADL program pre-compliant to the same library specification libSpec
and s1, s2 initial configuration for Π1 and Π2, respectively. Then,
Π1〈s1〉≈ADLs Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈SSs Π2〈s2〉
Proof. Assume Π1 6≈SSs Π2, then there are initial configuration s1 ∈ TΠ1 , s2 ∈ TΠ2 and views t1 ∈
SViewss1(TΠ1), t2 ∈ SViewss2(TΠ2) such that t1 6∼ t2 for TΠ1 and TΠ2 their respective ADL symbolic
split-state semantics with respect to some attacker strategy I. We obtain two views witnessing that
Π1〈s1〉6≈ADLs Π2〈s2〉 from t1 and t2 as follows. If there is a consecutive pair of elements of form
((out, rop, x, y), (in, x)) or ((out, rop, x, y), (in,⊥)) with rop ∈ ROP and x, y ∈ T in t1 or t2, then the
second element is removed.
Observe that for transition that invoke neither attacker nor library both semantics permit the same
transitions. Transitions of the form (out, . . .), (in, . . .) or (LC, . . .), (libResp, . . .) correspond immediately,
as the library and attacker semantics can be inlined, the only exception being the rule IfTest-m.
Wherever IfTest-m is invoked, an event of form rop ∈ ROP and x, y ∈ T is in the view, hence V ` x
as well as V ` y for V the view at this point. Thus, if this transformation (let us call it θ) is applied,
θ(t1) ∈ SViewss1(Π1) and θ(t2) ∈ SViewss2(Π2). If t1 6∼ t2, then θ(t1) 6∼ θ(t2), as the transformation
only removes input elements that are irrelevant for the knowledge set, and is preserving the structure
in the following sense: if θ removes the ith element of t1, it also removes the ith element of t2, otherwise
the i− 1 prefix of t1 and t2 was not symbolically equivalent.
In Lemma 13, we show that for the embedding presented in Section 7.6 static equivalence in CoSP
implies static equivalence in the symbolic variant of ADL.
7.5 Constructing the CoSP-embedding
Previous work [6, 14] defined the embedding into CoSP indirectly, namely via a symbolic and com-
putational execution that followed the structure of a CoSP execution (see Definition 6 and 12). This
work, in contrast, explicitly defines an embedding. As CoSP trees are infinite, we define the em-
bedding in a co-recursive manner, i.e., as the largest fixpoint of a co-recursive construction. Each
step in this recursion is defined by a function ETH(s) that takes as input a trace from a leaf-node in
the so-far constructed CoSP tree to the root node and outputs a finite subtree. After defining this
largest fixpoint construction, we concentrate on defining the recursion ETH(s). We stress that our
construction is defined on the honest program semantics of any over-approximated semantics. Hence,
this construction is valid for the canonical symbolic model, too.
7.5.1 Instantiating the over-approximated split-state semantics with references
Within the embedding, we instantiate the honest program semantics in the over-approximated split-
state form (see Definition 45), but replace values originating from the cryptographic library or the
attacker by pointers to computation nodes or input nodes, respectively. Formally, we instantiate the
set Dc := Pos with the set of positions in a CoSP tree. Here, positions are sequences of natural
numbers that encode which path through the CoSP-tree was taken, i.e., Pos := N∗. In the case of
ADL, registers and heap locations thus store values that have been input by the adversary or the
crypto-API by pointing to the position of the respective input or computation nodes in addition
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Figure 14: Construction of the recursion step ETH(s)
to numerical values, locations and void. In order to transmit these values to the adversary or the
crypto-API, these positions are resolved to a node identifier. The CoSP execution itself takes care of
translating, e.g., node identifiers of input nodes to the value the attacker choose to send at this point.
Note that there is no unique representation in N ′c for all values in N (i.e., there is no bijection
between the sets as required by Definition 3), but (as we will see below) the transitions in Figure 11,
which are the only ones using Nc representations, are never be used. All other transitions are still
well-defined.
Recall that states Lemma 4 that the ADL split-state representation is not probabilistic anymore,
and contains non-determinism only in global transitions, i.e., transitions with labels in out ∪ in ∪
libCall ∪ libResp.
7.5.2 Constructing the algorithm for the recursion step
The core of the embedding is the recursion step algorithm ETH(s)(p, pos). As an input, the algorithm
expects a path p from a leaf edge `0 (see Figure 14, phase I.) of the already constructed CoSP tree
to the tree’s root and the position of the last node in this path. If the leaf node in this already
constructed CoSP tree has several outgoing edges, the input p, in particular, also contains one of the
outgoing edges (labelled with `0 in Figure 14). We first give an overview of the recursion step, then
describe all auxiliary functions that we use in the full description, and finally present the construction
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in Figure 15 in full detail.
Overview. Let the split-state transition system T = (TH , TL,A) (i.e., the program in the case of
ADL) to be embedded and the initial configuration s be fixed. As Figure 14 depicts, the algorithm
can be divided into the following four phases.
I. Extract from the prefix p the label `0 of the last edge in the CoSP tree that has already been
constructed. This last label `0 determines whether the last subtree that was constructed in the
co-recursive computation of the CoSP-tree ended with a computation node or an input node.
This check corresponds to split-state transition system ending with a global transition LR or in.
We call this last node ν. We construct ETH(s) such that ν is annotated with the sequence of
states (s0, . . . , sq) of the honest program semantics.6
– If ν is a computation node and `0 = “no′′, set the variable y to the empty reference: y:= ⊥.
– Otherwise (i.e., `0 = “yes′′ or ν is an input node), set the variable y to the position of ν,
as illustrated in Figure 14.
II. Reconstruct a path through the over-approximated honest program semantics TH (together
with the initial state s) with the states (s0, . . . , sq). Check how many possible successors sq has.
ETH(s) is constructed such that after sq there is always a global transition, either LC or out. We
determine the successor node sq+1 via the global transition mapping δ`1 : sq+1 := δ`1(sq, y).
III. Run the over-approximated honest program semantics TH from sq+1 until the first global tran-
sition `2.
IV. Construct the corresponding CoSP-subtree as follows.
– If `2 is of the form (LC, f, uk, ,˙uk+n−1), place a sequence Ci of computation nodes that
computes the value for each of the arguments uk+i (i ∈ 0, . . . , n− 1). Then, compute a
sequence Cf of computation nodes for the function f that uses the results of the respective
sequences C0, . . . , Cn−1. Finally, annotate the final computation nodes of Cf with the
sequence (sq+1, . . . , sm) of states that occurred in step III.
– If `2 is of the form (out, f, u1, ,˙un), place a sequence C of computation nodes that compute
the value for (f, u1, . . . , un), where f is only an identifier for the malicious function f that
triggered the communication to the attacker. Below, place an output node that sends the
result of C to the attacker, and one node further place an input node. Annotate the final
input node with the sequence (sq+1, . . . , sm) of states that occurred in step III.
In the construction of E, we use four auxiliary functions: exSt , to extract the honest program
semantics-state encoded in a node identifier, exAllSt , to extract a list of states that are encoded in a
trace of a CoSP tree, t, to find the next global out- or libCall-transition, and id , to find a node for a
given position parameter pos.
Extracting states: the auxiliary functions exSt and exAllSt. We define exSt(ν) as the last
state reconstructed out of the identifier ν, and exAllSt(ν1 → . . . νn) as the function that extract the
entire sequence of states from ν1 → . . . νn.
Next global out- or libCall-transition: the auxiliary function t. We use p→ to denote a path
ending at an edge.
t(p→, sˆ, n) :=

(sˆ, n) if S(p→, sˆ) = {s′} ∧ sˆ out∪libCall−−−−−−−→H s′
t(p→, s′, n+ 1) if S(p→, sˆ) = {s′} but none of the above
(sˆ, n) if S(p→, sˆ) = ∅
where S denotes the set of successor states, except when called on the state encoded in the last edge
of p, denoted tl(p).
S(p
l−→, sˆ) :=
{
{s′} if |{s′′ | sˆ→H s′′}| > 1 ∧ sˆ equals the last state in exAllSt(p) ∧ sˆ→lH s′
{s′ | sˆ→H s′} otherwise
6This sequence of states corresponds to the resulting CoSP subtree from last (co-recursive) invokation of ETH (s).
This overview makes this correspondence precise.
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Phase I.
Let p′ := p→ ν [`0]−−→. Let y := ⊥ if `0 = no and y := id(pos) otherwise. Let (s0, . . . , sq) := exSt(ν).
Phase II.
Let sq+1 := δ`1 (sq , y) if z = (`1,_) ∧ `1 ∈ {in, LR}, and s0 → · · · → sq
z−→H sq+1
Phase III.
Let `2 be defined as t(p′, sq+1, 1) = (sm,m− (q + 1)) ∧ sm `2−→H sm. In particular, sq+1 → · · · → sm.
Phase IV.
ETH (s)(p→ ν
[`0]−−→, pos) :=
c1 →∗ cl → OutN (id(pos′′))
→ InN [((sq+1, . . . , sm), pos′)]→
if `2 = (out, f, u1, . . . , un), where pos′ := pos′′ · (0)2
and (c1 →∗ cl, pos′′) := Comp(pos, f, u1, . . . , un, p′)
c1 →∗ cl →
CompN (f, id(posk), . . . , id(posk+n−1))
[((sq+1, . . . , sm), pos
′)]
{
yes−−→, no−→
}
if `2 = (LC, f, uk, . . . , uk+n−1), where
(c1 →∗ clk , posk) := Comp(pos, uk, p′), . . . ,
(c1+lk+n−2 →∗ cl, posk+n−1) := Comp(pos, uk+n−1, p′),
pos′ := posk+n−1 · (0)u,
and u is the length of CompN (f, id(posk), . . . , id(posk+n−1))
Comp(pos, u, p) :=
(c1 →∗ ck, pos · (0)k) if u = u1 ∧ u1 ∈ S ∧ S ∈ {N ,L, {void}}
c1, . . . , ck = CoSPRep(ιS(u1), p)
((), u1) if u = u1 ∧ u1 ∈ Pos
(c1 →∗ ck →∗ cl → if u = (u1, . . . , uh) ∧ (c1 →∗ ck, pos1) = Comp(pos, u1, p)∧
CompN (pair , id(pos1, p), id(pos2, p)), pos2 · (0)) (ck+1 →∗ cl, pos2) = Comp(pos1, (u2, . . . , uh), p)→ ck+1
CoSPRep(t, p) outputs the representation of a term t in terms of a CoSP path p in an topological sorting of the
following tree: for each position in t, there is a node annotated with the constructor at the position, referencing
the identifiers of the nodes of its subterms. An edge exists between two nodes iff the term corresponding to the
second node is a subterm of the term corresponding to the first node.
CompN (f, ref 1, . . . , ref n) is the CoSP tree that corresponds to the symbolic operation f with the references
ref 1, . . . , ref n. Let u be the length of the (linear) CoSP tree that corresponds to f .
Figure 15: Construction of the embedding, where ν[(s, pos)] means that the identifier of ν is set to
(s, pos).
Node for a position: the auxiliary function id . We construct a pair representation for every
register name v ∈ l, by first computing the node identifiers for each value at r(v). If r(v) ∈ Nc, it
is a reference to a previous node, which we resolve with the following function, that identifies the
position on the current path. We slightly abuse notation by making the position in the node identifier
explicit. Note that positions must refer to node on the previous path, as node identifiers, too, can
only reference nodes in the prefix of the their path.
id(pos, ∅) := ⊥
id(pos, p′ → (sˆ, pos′)→) :=
{
(sˆ, pos) if pos = pos′
id(pos, p′ →) otherwise
7.5.3 Corecursively defining the embedding
As outlined above, we are at this point in the position to define the mapping of a (potentially infinite)
transition system (the honest program semantics) to an infinite CoSP tree. We define the mapping
as the largest fixpoint of a corecursive procedure. For technical reasons (to make the fixpoint unique)
and since CoSP trees are necessarily infinite, we first append to the translation of each leaf of the
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tree that is spanned by the transition system and an initial configuration an infinite chain of control
nodes, which we call a dummy tree.
Definition 52 (Dummy subtree). A dummy node is a control nodes that has as out-metadata its
position in the tree and that has a single successor with in-metadata 0. A dummy subtree is an
infinite tree that solely consists of dummy nodes. We call the tree that solely consists of dummy nodes
the empty CoSP protocol.
Finally, we can define the embedding of an ADL program as the largest fixpoint as the procedure
that step-wise applies Eor appends a dummy subtree if the transition system reaches a final state.
Definition 53 (Embedding of an ADL program). Let rootpath(edge) be the unique path from the
edge to the root. Consider the following definition U(TH , p):
• if ETH(s)(p) is undefined return a dummy subtree (see Definition 52) to p;
• otherwise,
– let pa := ETH(s)(p),
– append pa to p resulting in a tree par, and
– return the tree where to each leaf le of par the subtree U(TH(s), rootpath(le)) is appended.
The embedding U(TH(s)) of an honest program transition system TH with initial configuration s is
co-recursively defined as the greatest fixpoint of U(TH(s), ε).
We stress that this greatest fixpoint e(TH(s)) is unique.
Each CoSP protocol e(TH(s)) is efficient. For each honest program semantics TH(s) with initial
configuration s, e(TH(s)) is efficient in the sense of CoSP. Our algorithm E gives rise to an algorithm
that produces an efficient CoSP protocol in the sense of Definition 13, i.e., that only outputs the
identifier of the identifier of the next node N and a set of labels for its outgoing edges. This is trivially
done by encoding the list of next steps within the identifier.
7.6 Soundness of the CoSP-embedding
We have to show that for every pair of transition system TH,1, TH,2 and respective initial configu-
rations s1, s2 with TH,1(s1)≈SSs TH,2(s2) (i.e., that are equivalent in the split-state semantics) that
TH,1(s1)≈CoSPs TH,2(s2) holds (i.e., they are is symbolically equivalent in the sense of CoSP). First,
we introduce some notation that we use to make the proof more readable, and then we present the
soundness proof.
7.6.1 Preliminary definitions
In order to make the proof more readable, we introduce some notation: first the view of an attacker,
called out-traces, and second quasi atomic traces, which are used to characterize the subsequences of
an honest program semantics execution sequence that is processed by E.
Distribution of out-traces. In the CoSP-computational execution 〈ExecM,Impl,TH(s)(η)‖A(η)〉,
let OutTracesM,Impl,TH(s),A,p(η) be the distribution of messages that ExecM,Impl,TH (η) sends to A(η)
if output nodes are encountered such that the combined runtime of ExecM,Impl,TH (η) and A(η) is
≤ p(η).
Define for transition systems:
•
Pr[(a1, . . . , an) = Traces≤n(T )] =
∑
(α1, . . . , αm)|A
= (a1, . . . , an)
∧m ≤ n
Pr[Exec(T ) = s0
α1−→m1 · · · αm−−→mm sm]
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• And in general, for random variable X, Pr[t = X|S ] ··=
∑
t′|S=t Pr[t
′ = X].
Then, let T be any split-state semantics with Crypto-API semantics TL which harmonizes with
the implementation Impl
Let OutTracesSSo,TH(s),A,p(η) be the distribution of out-traces of the transition system T =
(TH , TL,A) with runtime less or equal than p(η), i.e.,
Pr[t = OutTracesSSo,TH ,A,s,p(η)] =
∑
t′|pi=t
Pr[t′ = Tracesssη,z(T (s))],
where pi((out,m)) = m and undefined otherwise.
Quasi atomic traces. Given a path ending on an edge, and a state, the first step in the embedding
is to iteratively compute the follow-up state until it is no longer uniquely determined, or it involves
the attacker or crypto-API. We introduce the notion of an atomic trace and a global transition.
Definition 54 (Global transition). We call a transition s l−→ s′ a global transition if l ∈ out ∪ in ∪
libCall ∪ libResp.
Definition 55 (Atomic trace). A sequence s of of transition steps s := s1
l−→
n
sn is called an atomic
trace if no global transition occurs. We call a sequence s a quasi atomic trace if s = s1
l1−→ s′ l2−→ s|s′|+2
and l1 ∈ {in, LR} and l2 ∈ {out, LC}.
7.6.2 The proofs
Lemma 8. For a sequence s of transitions from an honest program semantics TH that begins at
an initial configuration s, let q0,→H · · · →H qn be a partitioning into quasi atomic traces qi. Let →
denote an edge in the CoSP tree. Let e(qi) := ETH(s)(qi), and let exAllSt be defined as in Section 7.5.2.
With this notation, the following two properties hold.
(i) For all initial atomic traces q0, we have exAllSt(e(q0)) = q0.
(ii) For all i ∈ N there is a polynomial p such that we have
qi →H qi+1 =⇒ e(qi)→ e(qi+1) ∧ exAllSt(e(qi+1)) = qi+1
Proof. We show Property (i). Upon each invocation of ETH(s) a quasi atomic trace or an atomic trace
following by one global out- or LC-transition is generated inside ETH(s) and stored in the last node;
hence Property (i) holds.
Next, we show that Property (ii) also follows from the construction of ETH(s) and e. If qi → qi+1,
then e calls ETH(s) with a prefix p → ν x−→ such that exAllSt(ν) = e(qi). Then, ETH(s) internally
computes the transitions beginning from the final state of qi. The branchings coincide since by
Definition 45 →H only branches after LR-transitions, which are properly captured by the definition of
ETH(s). We know that the quasi atomic trace beginning from the final state of qi is a sequence due
to the fact that whenever a branching occurs, the library or the adversary is queried. Moreover, the
computation in ETH(s) does not get stuck, despite the fact that the registers carry references instead
of values, due to Property (i) of Definition 44. Since qi → qi+1, there is a subtree e(qi) → e(qi+1) in
e(TH) and as above exAllSt(e(qi+1)) = qi+1 holds by inspecting the construction of ETH(s).
Lemma 9. Let a symbolic model M together with an implementation Impl be given. For each honest
program semantics TH , for each (attacker) interactive machine A such that (TH , TL,A) satisfies Def-
inition 45, the following holds: there is an interactive machine RA and a polynomial p′ such that for
sufficiently large security parameters η we have
OutTracesSSo,TH ,A,s,p(η) = OutTracesM,Impl,e(TH(s)),RA,p′(η)
if OutTracesSSo,TH ,A,p(η) uses some Crypto-API TL := (TL,η)η∈N that harmonize with Impl (see
Definition 46).
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Proof. We show that for every honest program semantics TH , every (attacker) interactive machine A,
and every resulting out-trace, there is a corresponding out-trace in the CoSP execution. We prove this
by induction over the length of the out-trace of the honest program semantics TH . More formally, for
all honest program semantics TH , we consider a modified transition system TH |n that behaves just
like TH except that TH |n stops after it produced n out labels. We prove by induction over n that for
all honest program semantics TH and all n ∈ N, the statement holds for TH |n; hence the statement
holds for polynomial-time computable prefixes.
Constructing the reduction RA. Before we begin with the induction proof, we define an interactive
machine RA from the attacker semantics A.
• The machine RA internally executes the attacker semantics A by iteratively computing the
successors until either a transition with an in label or until there is no unique successor.
• Whenever there is no unique successor but a distribution of successors, RA conducts a weighted
random choice, weighted with the probabilities of each successor.
• Whenever the semantics conducts a transition s (in,m)−−−−→ s′, store s′ and send m to the communi-
cation partner (i.e., the computational CoSP execution).
• Whenever RA receives a message f,m1, . . . ,mn from the interaction partner (i.e., the computa-
tional CoSP execution) and the (internal) attacker semantics is currently in state 〈ε, as, ε〉, RA
sets the successor state to be s′ := 〈(f,m1, . . . ,mn), as, ε〉, and using s′ the attacker RA then
internally executes the attacker semantics as above.
For notational convenience, we introduce the following notation outsso(i) :=
OutTracesSSo,TH |i,A,p(η) and outcosp(i) := OutTracesM,Impl,e(TH |i),RA,p(η).
Induction base: n = 0. By definition, for all honest program semantics TH , the support of outsso(0)
is the empty set. The support of outcosp(0) is empty as well, since ETH |0(s) (and thus e(TH |0)) solely
produces output nodes whenever there is an out-label in the honest program semantics of SSo.
Induction step: n > 0. We assume that for all honest program semancs TH the restricted program
TH |n−1 satisfies the statement. Let TH be an arbitrary but fixed honest program semantics.
Fixing the randomness. It suffices to prove the statement for an arbitrary but fixed set of random
choices r := (rA, rL) ∈ {0, 1}∗ in A, written as A(rA), and the cryptographic library, written as
Impl(rL) in CoSP and SSo(rL) in the over-approximated split-state semantics. We show that for
sufficiently large η, for all polynomials p, there is a polynomial p′ such that for r := (rA, rL)
outsso(n, r) = outcosp(n, r),
where outsso(i, r) := OutTracesADLoSS (rL), TH |i,A(rA),p(η) and outcosp(i, r) :=
OutTracesM,Impl(rL),e(TH |i),RA(r),p(η).
Reduction to analyzing the last element in outsso(n, r). We first show that it suffices to concentrate
on proving the statement for the last element in outsso(n, r). Recall that l|k0 denotes the k-prefix of l.
If
outsso(n, r)|n−10 6= outcosp(n, r)|n−10
holds, then there is a subset r′ of r such that
outsso(n− 1, r′) 6= outcosp(n− 1, r′)
holds by induction hypothesis.
Analyzing the last element in outsso(n, r). For the last element in outsso(n, r), we treat all out-
transitions uniformly. The last element in outsso(n, r) is of the form (f, ([r(v)]N )v∈l) for f ∈ UNOP∪
BINOP∪RELOP∪Malstatic and l ∈ {(vb), (vb, vc), (va, vb), (va, . . . , ve)}, caused by a honest program
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transition s
(out,f,([r(v)]N )v∈l)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s. RA(r) behaves just like A(r) by definition and in particular the input
messages are the same. Hence, we know that the inputs, sent to the computational CoSP execution
are the same as those that the attacker semantics sends via in-transition labels. Moreover, for fixed
randomness, the output of the cryptographic library in the CoSP execution are exactly the same as
in the library semantics.
As a consequence and by Lemma 8, the state s (from above) is the same (up to the content of the
registers) as the state that is internally computed by ETH |n(s) before the output node is produced.
Finally, we first stress that the number of computational steps of each invocation of ETH(s) is
polynomially bounded (in η). Hence, for each polynomial p there is a polynomial p′ such that the
computations coincide. In conclusion, Claim 1 together with definition of ETH |n(s) implies that the
last element in outsso(n, r) coincides with the last element in outcosp(n, r).
We first prove the preservation in the computational model.
Lemma 10. Let TH,1 and TH,2 be two uniform families with respective initial configurations s1, s2
of ADL programs compliant (see Definition 47) with the same library specification libSpec w.r.t. to a
symbolic modelM and an implementation of it, called Impl. Let e the injective embedding into CoSP,
and s1 and s2 initial configurations. Then,
e(TH,1(s1))≈CoSPc e(TH,2(s2)) =⇒ TH,1(s1)≈SSc TH,2(s1).
Proof. We assume e(TH,1(s1))≈CoSPc e(TH,2(s2)), i.e., for all machines A and all polynomials p, there
is a negligible function µ such that for all a, b ∈ {0, 1} with a 6= b, all z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and η ∈ N:
Pr[〈ExecM,Impl,e(TH,1(s1))(η)‖A(η, z)〉 ↓p(η) a]
+ Pr[〈ExecM,Impl,e(TH,2(s2))(η)‖A(η, z)〉 ↓p(η) b] ≤ 1 + µ(η).
Proof by contradiction. Assume TH,1(s1)6≈SSc TH,2(s2), i.e., for some family of adversaries (Aη)η∈N ∈
ADV, ADLSSTηH,1,Aη,s1 and ADL
SS
TηH,2,Aη,s2 are distinguishable (see Definition 48). Thus, there are a, b ∈
{0, 1}, a 6= b and η ∈ N such that, there is a polynomials p such that for all negligible functions µ,
Pr
[
ADLSSTηH,1,Aη,s1 ↓p(η) a
]
+ Pr
[
ADLSSTηH,2,Aη,s2 ↓p(η) b
]
> 1 + µ(η).
(See Definition 36.) By Corollary 1, there is an attacker A, and a polynomial p′ s.t.
Pr
[
ADLoSSTηH,1,A′,s1 ↓p(η) a
]
+ Pr
[
ADLoSSTηH,2,A′,s2 ↓p(η) b
]
> 1 + µ(η).
Thus, by Lemma 9, we obtain the contradiction to the inequality assumed to, concluding the proof.
In order to match the notation in the overview, we write e(Πi〈si〉) for e(TH,i(si)) in the following
lemmas, for two ADL programs Π1,Π2 and two initial configurations s1, s2.
Lemma 11. Let Π1 and Π2 two ADL program together with input configurations s1, s2 in the canon-
ical symbolic model with respect to a CoSP-symbolic model M. Let Π1 and Π2 be compliant (see
Definition 47) with the same library specification w.r.t a symbolic model M and an implementation
Impl. Then,
e(Π1〈s1〉)≈CoSPc e(Π2〈s2〉) =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈SSc Π2〈s2〉.
Next, we can prove the statement for the symbolic side.
Lemma 12. Let TH,1 and TH,2 be honest program semantics with respective input configuration s1, s2
in the canonical symbolic model with respect to a CoSP-symbolic model M. Then,
TH,1(s1)≈SSs TH,2(s2) =⇒ e(TH,1(s1))≈CoSPs e(TH,2(s2))
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Proof. First, observe that the embedding takes as input any honest program semantics in the over-
approximated semantics. Hence, it does exactly the same for the honest program semantics in canon-
ical symbolic model. The same argumentation as in Lemma 9 can be made to show that the states in
the canonical symbolic semantics and in the identifiers of the nodes in the embedded program (charac-
terized by the honest program semantics) coincide. The most significant difference is that the attacker
is not defined as an interactive machine but rather as a set of deduction rules that are induced by the
constructors and the destructors. Instead of fixing an attacker machine, as in the proof of Lemma 9,
we fix an attacker strategy (see Definition 6) and then conduct the same induction proof over the
length of the deduction sequence (including the steps of the attacker’s deductions). Trace equivalence
of TH,i(si) (for i ∈ {1, 2}) in the canonical symbolic model and of e(TH,i(si)) then implies
TH,1(s1)≈SSs TH,2(s2) =⇒ e(TH,1(s1))≈CoSPs e(TH,2(s2))
Lemma 13. Let Π1 and Π2 two ADL program together with input configurations s1, s2 in the canonical
symbolic model with respect to a CoSP-symbolic model M. Let Π1 and Π2 be pre-compliant with the
same library specification. Then,
Π1〈s1〉≈SSs Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ e(Π1〈s1〉)≈CoSPs e(Π2〈s2〉)
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Lemma 12.
Our computational soundness result is parametric in a given symbolic model and given conditions
CI to the implementation and the protocols such that computational soundness in the sense of the
CoSP framework holds. Our result states that for any symbolic model with conditions C in CoSP,
equivalence in symbolic ADL (see Section 6) implies indistinguishability in ADL (see Section 5). Since
all CoSP results in the literature characterize the protocol class by a set of protocol conditions CP ,
we use these protocol conditions in our theorem as well.
For our main theorem, we require that two ADL programs are compliant (see Definition 47), i.e.,
use the library in the same way, and the library produces the same distribution as the implementation
Impl from the computational soundness result with a library specification libSpec (see Definition 46).
Theorem 1. Let a symbolic model M, protocol conditions CP and implementation conditions CI
that are computationally sound in the sense of CoSP (Definition 15) be given. Let Π1 and Π2 be two
uniform families of ADL programs compliant (see Definition 47) with initial configurations s1, s2 and
the same library specification libSpec w.r.t. to a symbolic model M and all implementations Impl that
satisfy CI . Then, the following implication holds
Π1〈s1〉≈ADLs Π2〈s2〉 =⇒ Π1〈s1〉≈ADLc Π2〈s2〉.
Proof. Follows by transitivity of ⇒ from Lemmas 7, 13, 11, and 6, as well as the assumption, that
the Impl is a computationally sound implementation of the symbolic model M.
8 Related work
Operational semantics for Dalvik Bytecode. We have opted to ground our work on the Abstract
Dalvik Language (ADL) [4]. ADL currently excels over alternative semantics such as the ones proposed
by Wognsen et al. [19], Xia et al. [20], TaintDroid [3], and Chaudhuri [21] because of its comprehensive
treatment of the Dalvik language, even though ADL currently only provides sequential executions and
does not support exceptions. TaintDroid is more general in this respect in that it contains an ad-hoc
modelling of concurrent execution. However, in the ADL extension put forward with the adversary
that includes probabilistic choices and adversary interactions, concurrency in ADL can be modelled
via program transformations, as we discuss in Section 7.
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Information-flow control with cryptographic primitives. The standard notion of security in
information flow control – non-interference – is too strong when cryptographic operations are being
considered, as, e.g., an encryption of a secret key and a secret message is intuitively safe to be stored
in a public variable, but it nontheless results in different values depending on the key and the message.
While the declassification of values (see [22] for an introduction and overview of results) can be used
to relax this notion, it is difficult to decide under what circumstances cryptographic values can be
safely declassified.
Our approach is similar to Askarov et al.’s, permitting so-called cryptographically masked flows by
considering a relaxed equivalence notion on public values, masking acceptable information flow when
ciphertexts are made public [23]. Instead of actually comparing low-values, e.g., encryptions of secret
messages, an equivalence relation relates them, e.g., if the encrypted messages have equal length, both
encryptions are considered low-equivalent. A security-type system is introduced, which is sound with
respect to possibilistic non-interference and said notion of low-equivalence.
Laud has shown the computational soundness of this approach [24] if the employed encryption
scheme satisfies key-dependent message security, provides plaintext integrity, and the program is well-
structured, i.e.,keys are only used in the correct key position, etc. As cryptographically masked flows
are captured in a possibilistic setting, leaks through probabilistic behavior are not captured; hence
the program must not be able to branch on probabilistic values. Consider the following program:
x := rnd(0, 1); if x then l := h else l := rnd(1, 100)
While the program is non-interferent in the possibilistic setting, as any final value l has could be
random choice in the second branch, it is not non-interferent (insecure) in the probabilistic setting as
it is very likely that l indeed contains the value of h.
The consequence for this work is that, since we consider non-interference in the possibilistic setting,
we cannot allow any computation on cryptographic values, as these will allow to implement (some-
thing close to) rnd using probabilistic operation like encryption. In our work, we treat computations
performed on cryptographic values conservatively by relaying them to the adversary. Furthermore,
previous work introduced security type-systems, such as [25], and program analyses, such as [26], that
directly operate on the computational semantics and are thus capable of verifying non-interference in a
probabilistic setting. This approach avoids the aforementioned problem at the cost of less modularity
and less potential for automation than our approach.
Computational Soundness. On computational soundness, there is a rich body of literature for
various cryptographic primitives [11,27–29], with malicious keys [8,30], and even composable compu-
tational results [31,32]. Even though these works covered the applied pi-calculus [6,30,33], the stateful
applied pi calculus [34] and RCF [14] and even a embedding of a fragment of C [35], none of these
works provide a computational soundness result is known for Dalvik bytecode and hence for Android
app analysis.
Another line of work does not provide a complete symbolic characterization of the attacker but
concentrates on single rules that hold for certain symbolic terms [36, 37]. This restriction enables a
much more flexible and composable preservation notion but pays with omitting any guarantee that
the set of rules characterizes all attacker-actions. Hence, it is not clear how well-suited this approach
is to automation.
Interactive proof assistants for cryptography. Cryptographic proof assistants enable the
mechanized verification of cryptographic proofs, without first abstracting the cryptographic opera-
tions [38–40]. Consequently, these tools only offer limited automation. Yet complementarily, these
tools could be used to verify that a library satisfies the conditions that a computational soundness
result requires.
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9 Conclusion and future work
We have shown how cryptographic operations can be faithfully included into existing approaches for
automated app analysis. Our results overcome the overly pessimistic results that arise when current
automated approaches deal with apps that contain cryptographic operations, as these results do not
account for secrecy properties offered by cryptographic operations such as encryption. We have shown
how cryptographic operations can be expressed as symbolic abstractions within Dalvik bytecode, so
that these abstractions can be conveniently added to existing app analysis tools using minor changes
in their semantics. Moreover, we have established the first computational soundness result for the
Abstract Dalvik Language (ADL) [4], which currently constitutes the most detailed and comprehensive
operational semantics for Dalvik in the literature.
A result that we only scratched on in this work is that any small-step semantics expressed in
our novel split-state form entails a canonical small-step semantics for a symbolic model that is com-
putationally sound. This hence provides a recipe for establishing computationally sound symbolic
abstractions for any given programming language, provided that one can show that the interaction
with the attacker and the cryptographic operations can be expressed by means of our concept of split-
state semantics. We plan to further investigate this claim and its applicability to modern programming
languages in future work.
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rNop
m[pp] = nop
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r〉
rGoto
m[pp] = goto n
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ n, r〉
Figure 16: Semantics of control flow instructions
Appendix
A Inference rules for the DEX Bytecode Semantics
B Extendability
Definition 56 (Efficient transparent function). An n-ary constructor f is transparent if for every
argument i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a destructor dinverse,i, called the i-th inverse function of f , such that
for all terms M1, . . . ,Mn, we have evaldinverse,if(M1, . . . ,Mn) = Mi.
Definition 57 (Finitely generated message types). A message type T is finitely generated if there
exists a grammar with rules r1, . . . , rn such that T equals the set that is generated by r1, . . . , rn.7
Definition 58 (Combination of two finitely generated message types). Let T be a finitely generated
message types over C and N with a grammar r1, . . . , rn, and let T′ be a finitely generated message
types over C′ and N′ with a grammar r′1, . . . , r′m such that C ∩C′ = ∅ and N ∩N′ = ∅. Then, the
combination T unionsqT′ of T and T′ is the set that is generated by the rules r1, . . . , rn, r′1, . . . , r′m.
Definition 59 (Combination of two symbolic models). Let a symbolic modelM = (C,NEunionmultiNP,T,D)
and another symbolic modelM′ = (C′,NE′unionmultiNP′,T′,D′) with C∩C′ = ∅, D∩D′ = ∅, NE∩NE′ = ∅,
NP ∩NP′ = ∅, T ∩T′ = ∅ be given. Then, the combination of M and M′ is defined as M unionsqM′ :=
(C ∪C′,N = NE ∪NE′ unionmultiNP ∪NP′,T unionsqT′,D ∪D′).
Definition 60 (Restriction-defined protocol class). Let a symbolic modelM = (C,N,T,D) be given.
We call a set R := {c1, . . . , cn} of functions from CoSP protocols to {>,⊥}, i.e., true or false, protocol
restrictions. A protocol class P is restriction-defined by R on M, written as P := P(R,M), if P is
the largest set of protocols for M (see Definition 4) such that ∀Π ∈ P.∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.ci(Π) = >.
Lemma 14. Given a symbolic model M with a implementation Impl of M. Let Mtrp =
(C′,N′,T′,D′) be a symbolic model with an implementation Impltrp such that all constructors f ∈ C′
are transparent functions. Let R be protocol restrictions (see Definition 60).
If the implementation Impl is computationally sound for M and the protocol class P(R,M), then
the implementation Impl∪ Impltrp is computationally sound for the symbolic modelMunionsqMtrp and the
protocol class P(R,M unionsqMtrp).
Proof. By contraposition it suffices to show that for any pair of protocols Π′1,Π′2 ∈ P(R,M unionsqMtrp),
the following holds
Π′1 6≈CoSPc Π′2 =⇒ Π′1 6≈CoSPs Π′2
Towards a contradiction, assume that
Π′1 6≈CoSPc Π′2 ∧Π′1≈CoSPs Π′2
holds. Our strategy is to show that there are protocols Π1,Π2 ∈ P(R,M) such that
7The notion of a set that is generated by a grammar is a common notion. It refers to the smallest fixpoint that obeys
the rules from the grammar.
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rInstanceOfTrue
m[pp] = instance-of va, vb, cl r(vb) ∈ dom(h)
assignmentCompatible(h(r(vb))).cls, cl
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ 1]〉
rInstanceOfFalse
m[pp] = instance-of va, vb, cl r(vb) ∈ dom(h)
¬(assignmentCompatible(h(r(vb)).cls, cl))
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 7→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ 0]〉
rNewInstance
m[pp] = new-instance va, cl h ∈ dom(nextFreeLocation)
l = nextFreeLocation(h)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h[l 7→ defaultObject(cl)], pp+ 1, r[va 7→ l]〉
rConstString
m[pp] = const-string va, s s ∈ dom(nameToReference)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ nameToReference(s)]〉
rConstClass
m[pp] = const-class va, cl cl ∈ dom(nameToReference)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ nameToReference(cl)]〉
rIget
m[pp] = iget va, vb, fid fid ∈ dom(lookup-fieldΠ)
r(vb) ∈ dom(h) o = h(r(vb))
f = lookup-fieldΠ(fid) f ∈ dom(o.fields)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ o.f ]〉
rIput
m[pp] = iput va, vb, fid fid ∈ dom(lookup-fieldΠ)
r(vb) ∈ dom(h) o = h(r(vb))
f = lookup-fieldΠ(fid) f ∈ dom(o.fields)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h[r(vb) 7→ o[f 7→ r(va)]], pp+ 1, r〉
rSget
m[pp] = sget va, fid fid ∈ dom(nameToReference)
l = nameToReference(fid) fid ∈ dom(lookup-fieldΠ)
f = lookup-fieldΠ(fid) f ∈ dom(h(l).fields) u = h(l).f
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ u]〉
rSput
m[pp] = sput va, fid fid ∈ dom(nameToReference)
l = nameToRefrence(fid) fid ∈ dom(lookup-fieldΠ)
f = lookup-fieldΠ(fid) o = h(l) f ∈ dom(o.fields)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h[l 7→ o[f 7→ r(va)]], pp+ 1, r〉
Figure 17: Semantics of object-related instructions
Π′1 6≈CoSPc Π′2 =⇒ Π1 6≈CoSPc Π2 (Claim 1)
Π1 6≈CoSPs Π2 =⇒ Π′1 6≈CoSPs Π′2 (Claim 2)
holds. These two statements imply that
Π1 6≈CoSPc Π2 ∧Π1≈CoSPs Π2
holds, which contradicts the computational soundness of Impl for M and P(R,M).
Claim 1. Π′1 6≈CoSPc Π′2 =⇒ Π1 6≈CoSPc Π2
Proof of Claim 1. First, we define the encoding of an n-ary transparent constructor f as follows:
encoding − f (ν1, . . . , νn) := pair(constructor-f, pair(ν1, pair(, . . . , pair(νn−1, νn))))
Analogously, we define the encoding of the i-th inverse function dinverse,i of f as the sequence
of the fst and snd destructor that projects to the i-th argument. We denote this encoding as
encoding − d − inverse − i(ν1).
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rArrayLength
m[pp] = array-length va, vb r(vb) ∈ dom(h)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ h(r(vb)).length]〉
rNewArray
m[pp] = new-array va, vb h ∈ dom(nextFreeLocation)
l = nextFreeLocation(h) 0 ≤ r(vb)
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h[l 7→ defaultArray(r(vb))], pp+ 1, r[va 7→ l]〉
rFilledNewArrayR
m[pp] = filled-new-array-range vk, n h ∈ dom(nextFreeLocation)
l = nextFreeLocation(h) x = defaultArray(n)
ar = x[0 7→ r(vk), . . . , n− 1 7→ r(vk+n−1)]
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h[l 7→ ar], pp+ 1, r[res lo 7→ l]〉
rAget
m[pp] = aget va, vb, vc r(vb) ∈ dom(h) ar = h(r(vb))
u = ar[r(vc)] 0 ≤ r(vc) < ar.length
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ u]〉
rAput
m[pp] = aput va, vb, vc r(vb) ∈ dom(h) ar = h(r(vb))
x = ar[r(vc) 7→ r(va)] 0 ≤ r(vc) < ar.length
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h[r(vb) 7→ x], pp+ 1, r〉
Figure 18: Semantics of array-related instructions
rIVR
m[pp] = invoke-virtual-range vk, n,mid r(vk) ∈ dom(h)
(mid, h(r(vk)).cls) ∈ dom(lookup-virtualΠ) m′ = lookup-virtualΠ(mid, h(r(vk)).cls)
〈h, 0, defaultRegisters([r(vk), . . . , r(vk+n−1)])〉 ⇓(n
′)
P,m′ 〈u, h′〉
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉−→n′+1Pm 〈h′, pp+ 1, r[res lo 7→ lower(u), resup 7→ upper(u)]〉
rIStR
m[pp] = invoke-static-range vk, n,mid
mid ∈ dom(lookup-staticΠ) m′ = lookup-staticΠ(mid)
〈h, 0, defaultRegisters([r(vk), . . . , r(vk+n−1)])〉 ⇓(n
′)
P,m′ 〈u, h′〉
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉−→n′+1Pm 〈h′, pp+ 1, r[res lo 7→ lower(u), resup 7→ upper(u)]〉
Figure 19: Semantics of method-related instructions
We inductively define Πi to equal Π′i except for occurrences of computation nodes ν that are labelled
with a transparent constructor or an inverse function, which are in Πi replaced by the sequence of
computation nodes that represents the encoding of the transparent constructor or its inverse function.
The claim follows since for all terms t1, . . . , tn the term
encoding − d − inverse − i(encoding − f (t1, . . . , tn)) evaluates to ti. 
Claim 2. Π1 6≈CoSPs Π2 =⇒ Π′1 6≈CoSPs Π′2
Proof of Claim 2. Analogous to the proof of Claim 1, Claim 2 follows since for all terms t1, . . . , tn
the term encoding − d − inverse − i(encoding − f (t1, . . . , tn)) evaluates to ti. 
B.1 Arbitrary bit-operations on bitstrings
We can extend any computationally sound symbolic model that contains the basic bitstring operations
string0/1, string1/1, unstring0/1, unstring1/1, emp/0 with
∀b ∈ {0, 1}.unstringb(stringb(x)) = x
to a symbolic model that contains all bitstring operations op : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ as long as the
respective destructor is solely defined on symbolic string. The proof encodes any operation on bitstring
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rUnopWideS
m[pp] = unop-wideS va, vb, uop
u = uop(r(vb) • r(vb+1))
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→ 〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ u]〉
rUnopWideT
m[pp] = unop-wideT va, vb, uop
u = uop(r(vb))
〈m ·ml, h, pp · ppl, r · rl, as〉 −→
〈h, pp+ 1, r[va 7→ lower(u), va+1 7→ upper(u)]〉
Figure 20: Semantics of conversion instructions for 64 bit values
to the corresponding circuit. Hence, we will restrict ourselves to illustrating how ∧,∨,¬ gates are
encoded on single bits:
∧(stringb1(emp), stringb2(emp))
1: if stringb1(emp) = string0(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string0(emp) then
2: return string0(emp)
3: else if stringb1(emp) = string1(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string1(emp) then
4: return string1(emp)
5: else if stringb1(emp) = string0(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string1(emp) then
6: return string0(emp)
7: else if stringb1(emp) = string1(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string0(emp) then
8: return string0(emp)
∨(stringb1(emp), stringb2(emp))
1: if stringb1(emp) = string0(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string0(emp) then
2: return string0(emp)
3: else if stringb1(emp) = string1(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string1(emp) then
4: return string1(emp)
5: else if stringb1(emp) = string0(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string1(emp) then
6: return string1(emp)
7: else if stringb1(emp) = string1(emp) ∧ stringb2(emp) = string0(emp) then
8: return string1(emp)
¬(stringb(emp))
1: if stringb(emp) = string0(emp) then
2: return string1(emp)
3: else if stringb(emp) = string1(emp) then
4: return string0(emp)
These encodings can be easily extended to bitstrings and used in order to encode arbitrary circuits,
hence any computable function op : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, on bitstrings. Given a bijection ι from bitstrings
to symbolic bitstrings as above, a symbolic binary operation dop/n is a destructor that is solely defined
on symbolic bitstrings as
dop(x1, . . . , xn) = ι(op(ι
−1(x1), . . . , ι−1(xn)))
As a corollary, we get
Corollary 2. Given a symbolic model M with a implementation Impl of M. Let MbitstringOp =
(∅,N′,T′,D′) be a symbolic model with an implementation ImplbitstringOp such that all destructors
f ∈ D′ are binary operations. Let R be protocol restrictions (see Definition 60).
If the implementation Impl is computationally sound for M and the protocol class P(R,M),
then the implementation Impl ∪ ImplbitstringOp is computationally sound for the symbolic model
M unionsqMbitstringOp and the protocol class P(R,M unionsqMtrp).
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B.2 Derived destructors with symbolic operations
Similar to transparent functions and bitstring operations on symbolic bitstrings, all destructors that
can be represented as a symbolic operation can be added to a computationally sound symbolic model
as destructors applied to nonces, i.e., destructor and nonce computation nodes, without loosing com-
putational soundness. With the formal parameters as holes, a symbolic operation O, with say n
variables, can be interpreted as a context over terms. Such a context naturally defines an n-ary de-
structor that is applied to nonces rk+1, . . . , rn via evalO(t1, . . . , tk, rk+1, . . . , rn).8 We call such a
destructor a derived destructor.
Such derived destructors can be encoded using constructors and destructors from the original
symbolic model, we can use the same proof techniques as above and conclude computational soundness
for the combined model.
Corollary 3. Given a symbolic model M with a implementation Impl of M. Let MderDes =
(∅,N′,T′,D′) be a symbolic model with an implementation ImplderDes such that all destructors f ∈ D′
are derived destructors and the implementation is the evaluation of the symbolic operation, using the
implementations of the constructors and destructors that occur in the symbolic operation. Let R be
protocol restrictions (see Definition 60).
If the implementation Impl is computationally sound for M and the protocol class P(R,M), then
the implementation Impl ∪ ImplderDes is computationally sound for the symbolic model M unionsqMderDes
and the protocol class P(R,M unionsqMtrp).
8Without loss of generality, we assumed here an order on the parameters.
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